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Smart Grid Metering Networks: A Survey on
Security, Privacy and Open Research Issues
Pardeep Kumar Member, IEEE , Yun Lin Member, IEEE, Guangdong Bai, Andrew Paverd Member, IEEE,
Jin Song Dong, and Andrew Martin Member, IEEE
Abstract— Smart grid (SG) networks are newly upgraded
networks of connected objects that greatly improve reliability,
efficiency and sustainability of the traditional energy infras-
tructure. In this respect, the smart metering infrastructure
(SMI) plays an important role in controlling, monitoring and
managing multiple domains in the SG. Despite the salient features
of SMI, security and privacy issues have been under debate
because of the large number of heterogeneous devices that are
anticipated to be coordinated through public communication
networks. This survey paper shows a brief overview of real
cyber attack incidents in traditional energy networks and those
targeting the smart metering network. Specifically, we present a
threat taxonomy considering: (i) threats in system-level security,
(ii) threats and/or theft of services, and (iii) threats to privacy.
Based on the presented threats, we derive a set of security and
privacy requirements for SG metering networks. Furthermore,
we discuss various schemes that have been proposed to address
these threats, considering the pros and cons of each. Finally, we
investigate the open research issues to shed new light on future
research directions in smart grid metering networks.
Index Terms—Smart grid communications, smart metering,
security, privacy, research directions.
I. INTRODUCTION
SMART grid (SG) networks are envisioned to be the nextevolutionary step of power supply networks [1]. These
networks typically include several advancements that will im-
prove the efficiency and reliability and provide uninterrupted
energy supply to homes and businesses. In addition, SG also
includes various renewable energy sources (e.g., solar, wind,
etc.), distributed generation (DG) and distributed storage (DS)
[2]–[6]. As shown by market research [7], the SG market is
projected to grow $20.83 billion in 2017 to $50.65 billion
by 2022. This market shift has therefore generated significant
interest from governments, industries and academia. The main
abbreviations are summarized in Table I.
SG networks consist of different domains, including (i) bulk
generation, (ii) energy transmission, (iii) energy distribution,
(iv) customers, (v) operation, (vi) market and (vii) service
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Fig. 1. A high-level conceptual model of the SG [8] [9] [10].
provider, as shown in Fig. 1. The upper domains, i.e., bulk gen-
eration, energy transmission, energy distribution and customer
are primarily connected by two-way energy flow (illustrated
with black solid lines). These upper domains are managed and
controlled by the underlying domains, i.e., operation, market
and service provider, via two-way information flow (illustrated
with red dotted lines) [8]. This two-way flow of energy and
data will enable new functionality between the consumers and
utilities in the SG.
To realise the aforementioned domains, one of the main
infrastructures is smart metering that will not only help to
evaluate the status of a power grid but also to manage those
distributed resources. It is anticipated that a large number
of heterogeneous devices (e.g., smart meters, sensors, etc.)
will be deployed between consuming points and monitoring
and controlling centers [11]–[13]. The term smart metering
system defines an intelligent electronic device that measures
energy usage data, with more precise information than a
traditional meter, and sends and receives data via two-way
communication [14]. As a result, smart metering networks
equipped with the information and communication technology
(ICT [15]), and working together with intelligent sensors allow
utility companies to manage and control the SG. Despite the
control and management capabilities of smart metering, the
collected metering data can be used by automated and intel-
ligent systems to enable new applications. These applications
may include load management programs, DG and DS control
systems and billing [13], [16], [17].
However, the mass dependence on ICT and smart metering
network technologies also open up several threat surfaces,
especially when the utility companies integrate several auto-
mated applications. A report published by the United States
Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) warns that
2the advanced persistent threat activities are targeting energy
sectors [18]. Recent studies reveal that the energy companies
can be predominantly subjected to targeted attacks [19], [20].
A targeted attack on the SG metering network could poten-
tially lead to slowdown or shutdown of the power grid systems,
and cripple the utility delivery systems. Exploitation of vul-
nerabilities in the SG metering network could affect individual
consumers, as well as infrastructure such as substations and
control centers [21]. Moreover, a threat is not only limited
to the SG metering network security but it can raise many
privacy issues for end-customers. For instance, a smart meter
usually sends energy reports every 15/30 minutes periodically
over wireless communication. An eavesdropper can intercept
such reports to invade the privacy of consumers, for example,
what time the property is occupied or empty [22] [23]. As a
result, the individuals’ private life patterns can be inferred or
can be used for criminal purposes.
Following the aforementioned issues, security and privacy
issues recently have been the subject of extensive research
because the public safety, and the national economy and secu-
rity are rely heavily on the energy networks. Although security
and privacy weaknesses are continuously being discovered in
the network technologies, protocols, and devices used in the
energy systems, the significance of threats to system level
security, threats or theft via services, and threats to privacy
are not always fully understood in SG metering networks. In
the following subsection, we discuss recent survey papers in
this field, and point out the distinguishing features and main
contributions of our work.
A. Existing Work
Recently, several survey papers have been conducted on the
security and privacy issues in SG domain, as follows.
Security: In 2013, Wang-Lu analyzed security challenges
in the SG network, including transmission and distribution
subsystems, AMIs, and HANs [24]. The authors presented
the security requirements and thoroughly evaluated network
threats with case studies. Moreover, the research mainly
considered cryptographic countermeasures including authen-
tication and key management in various SG domains. This
paper includes detailed analytical analysis including several
traditional protocols (e.g., distributed network protocol) in the
energy domains. Nevertheless, since 2013, extensive novel and
advanced security methods have been published and those
need to be explored.
In 2014, Komninos et al. presented smart grid and smart
home security [21]. The authors mainly considered the in-
teraction between the smart home and SG environments,
and classified their security risks. The paper discussed some
representative threats and evaluated theoretical impacts from
smart home to smart grid and vice versa. The authors provided
a survey of the available literature as the security counter-
measures and included the SG’s ongoing activities over the
period of 2009 – 2013. Though, Komninos et al. reviewed
several papers from the viewpoint of security countermeasures
including privacy, the critical analysis of these schemes (if any)
were not discussed.
TABLE I
ABBREVIATIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS
Abbreviation Description
ARP Address Resolution Protocol
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AMI Advanced Metering Infrastructure
ABE Attribute-Based Encryption
AVISPA Automated Verification of Internet Security Protocols and
Applications
BOC Back Office Compromise
CR Cognitive Radio
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
CI Critical Infrastructure
DCU Data Collector Unit
DPI Deep Packet Inspection
DoS Denial of Service
DNO Distribution Network Operator
DSS Distribution Sub-Station
DR, DRAS Demand Response, and Automation Server
DG, DS Distributed Generation, and Distributed Sources
DSR Dynamic Source Routing
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
FHE Full Homomorphic Encryption
HVE Hidden Vector Encryption
HAN Home Area Network
HEMS Home Energy Management System
HMI Human Machine Interfaces
HWMP Hybrid Wireless Mesh-Routing Protocol
IBC Identity-Based Cryptography
ICS Industrial Control System
ICT Information and Communication Technology
IED Intelligent Electronic Device
IoT Internet of Things
KDS Key Distribution Server
LTE Long-Term Evolution
MPS Main Power Supply
MAC Medium Access Control
MDMS Meter Data Management System
MITM Man-In-The-Middle
NAN neighbourhood area network
OIP Optimal Inspection Point
PREP Path Reply
PMU Phasor Measurement Unit
PHEV Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles
PREQ Proactive Path Request
PUF Physically Unclonable Function
PLC PowerLine Communication
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RFID Radio Frequency Identification
RTU Remote Terminal Units
SG, SM Smart Grid and Smart meter
SMI Smart Metering Infrastructure
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
SVM Support Vector Machine
TLS Transport Layer Security
TTP, TRE Trusted Third Party, and Remote Entity
TPM, TU Trusted Platform Module, Transmission Unit
US-CERT United State Computer Emergency Readiness Team
VPN Virtual Private Network
WSN Wireless Sensor Network
3TABLE II
COMPARISON WITH OTHER SURVEYS
Security
issue
Privacy
issue
Real attack
incidents Threat-I Threat-II Threat-III
Pros of
countermeasures
Cons of
countermeasures Paper covered
[24]
√
ND ND
√
ND ND
√
ND 2008–2012
[21]
√ √
ND
√
LD LD
√
ND 2010–2014
[25]
√ √
ND LD LD LD
√
ND 2010–2016
[2] ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 2008–2015
[26]
√
ND ND
√
ND ND
√
ND 2009–2016
[23]
√
ND LD LD
√ √ √
2007–2014
[27] ND
√
ND ND ND LD
√
ND 2008–2015
[28]
√ √
ND LD LD LD
√
ND 2007–2014
[29] LD LD ND LD ND LD
√
ND 2010–2015
[17] LD LD ND LD LD LD LD ND 2010–2018
Ours
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
2010–2018
Threat-I: Threats to system level security; Threat-II: Threats or Theft via services; Threat-III: Threats to privacy;
√
- Detailed Discussion; LD - Limited
Discussion; ND - No Discussion
Tan et al. discussed security advances in SG over the period
of 2010 – 2015 [25]. The authors covered the data driven
approaches, e.g., data generation security, data acquisition
security, data storage security, data processing security and
security analytics in the SG networks. They thoroughly ana-
lyzed the suitability of various security analytics techniques,
e.g., statistical methods, data mining and visualization. These
techniques can be employed in data analytics to ensure security
of the SG networks. However, Tan et al. did not consider
whether the proposed techniques have negative implications
and other complexities from the viewpoint of the SG networks.
In [2], the authors surveyed smart electicity meter data
intelligence techniques for future energy systems. Alakhakoon
and Yu first discussed the key aspects of the smart metering
process, and the interest of different stakeholders. The authors
then briefly discussed the smart metering tools, including sup-
port vector machine, and fuzzy logic. These tools can be used
to achieve metering intelligence, and to support stakeholder
applications, e.g., consumer profiling and load forecasting. The
security and privacy issues were briefly discussed in the paper,
but they were not the main focus of the paper.
In 2016, He and Yan focused on the cyber physical attacks
in the SG [26]. Similar to Wang-Lu’s survey, the authors
discussed the attack scenarios on the energy generation, trans-
mission, distribution, and electricity markets. In addition, the
authors pointed out some of the significant defence mech-
anisms including protection, detection and mitigation. The
survey does not provide details (e.g., pros and cons) of the
defence techniques.
In 2018, Stellios et al. [30] discussed the Internet of Things
(IoT) enabled cyberattacks in several critical infrastructures
(CIs), e.g., industry, smart grid, transportation, and healthcare.
The authors modeled a threat vector that can be used against
IoT devices. The threat vector includes critical IoT enabled
attacks and verified attacks in the CI systems. In addition, the
paper pointed out the hidden IoT enabled attack paths in CIs
and services. The authors discussed very detailed cyberattacks
in CIs. However, descriptions of their mitigations and solutions
are at a high level.
Privacy: Finster and Baumgart conducted a survey on
privacy-aware smart metering [23]. The authors first formu-
lated significant problems concerning privacy in smart meter-
ing: (i) metering for billing, and (ii) metering for operations.
Furthermore, they discussed several countermeasures, such as
billing via trusted party, cryptography, anonymization, and
aggregation in order to provide data privacy to the consumers.
The paper includes threats and schemes that were published
mainly over the period from 2007 to 2014.
Another work focused on the shortcomings of smart meter
data privacy and their solutions [27]. The survey covered
the following use cases: (i) billing, (ii) operations, and (iii)
value-added services. The authors mainly covered the research
results from 2008 to 2015. In addition, the authors in [23] and
[27] mainly discussed privacy concerns without considering
insecure networks. For instance, as the smart meter data
travels through insecure networks, consumers’ privacy can be
breached at network level. In addition, the detailed security
issues are not the scope of both surveys.
In 2014, Mohassel et al. presented a survey on advanced
metering infrastructure (AMI) [28]. They discussed the basic
concepts of AMI and briefly presented the physical and cyber
security challenges including privacy. The paper addressed
limited but significant security and privacy requirements in the
AMI network. However, the authors neither included detailed
threat model and discussion on the state-of-the-art security
schemes nor presented the privacy-preserving schemes. In
the same vein (in 2016), Yasin presented a survey on smart
metering and SG communication [29]. However, the survey
papers presented in [28] [29] mainly focus the literature
published from 2008 to 2014. In 2018, Wang et al. presented
a review of smart meter data analytics, methodologies and
challenges in many of smart metering key applications [17].
However, security and privacy issues are not the main goal of
the review paper.
B. Comparison with our survey
The previous surveys have their own advantages. Some of
the work presented in [21], [25], [26], and [30] categorized
many of security issues, for instance smart grid to home and
vice versa, security analytics, physical and cybersecurity, and
IoT enabled attacks in CIs, respectively, in SG. None of the
existing survey covers recent real-time attack incidents on the
4energy networks, except the work presented in [30]. Other
works [23], [27] and [28] focus on privacy in SG metering net-
works and present high level solutions with limited analysis. In
contrast to the existing survey papers, this survey provides up-
to-date activities of rapidly advancing research on SG metering
network security and privacy. Moreover, most of the existing
survey papers do not consider the detailed threat taxonomy by
categorizing it in terms of (i) threats to system level security,
(ii) threats and/or theft via services, and (iii) threats to privacy.
Moreover, we have pointed out various security and privacy
requirements that can be considered from the very beginning
of the SG metering network design. In addition, this survey
provides an analysis of previously published schemes which
are proposed as the security and privacy countermeasures,
and includes their pros and cons. Table II summarized a
comparison between the existing survey papers and our paper.
C. Our Contribution
Our work makes the following new contributions:
• A comprehensive view of security and privacy con-
cerns: Security and privacy are relevant albeit indepen-
dent concerns in the SG metering network. We discuss the
relationship between security and privacy in SG metering
networks. By providing such a comprehensive view, we
aim to shed light on how a SG security protocol can be
designed with regard to these respective concerns.
• Detailed taxonomy of SG attacks: We provide a de-
tailed and hierarchical taxonomy of SG metering attacks,
considering the attack surface of SG communication and
the attack intentions. The taxonomy includes the most
up-to-date literature to the best of our knowledge.
• A comprehensive study for security and privacy goals
and corresponding solutions: We summarize several
security and privacy goals in SG metering networks.
In addition, we provide comprehensive reviews on var-
ious existing solutions (with their pros and cons) which
claimed to address different security and privacy goals.
• Future research directions: Based on our study, we
identify further research problems to be addressed, along
with their early solutions and future directions.
D. Organisation of the paper
The overall organisation of this paper is shown in Fig. 2. To
facilitate the discussion (in Section III – X), we summarize the
background of SG metering network in Section II. In Section
III, discusses real attack incidents on the energy networks
and smart metering networks. These incidents reveal the lack
of adequate protection in SG metering networks. To explore
the security and privacy issues, we define a threat model
and a threat taxonomy that aim to understand several threats
in SG networks in Section IV.A, Section IV.B, respectively.
Then following the extensive literature from the industry and
academia, Section IV.C defines the principal security and
privacy requirements for SG metering networks. Based on
Section IV, we broadly explore the threat taxonomy (i.e.,
threats to system level security, threats to services and threats
I. Introduction
Problem statement
II. Background
SG metering network
IV.  Threat modeling, taxonomy,  security and 
privacy goals
Briefly present real attack incidents, and define 
threat model, taxonomy, and security & privacy 
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III.  Real attack incidents 
V.  Threats to 
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Fig. 2. Overall organisation of the survey paper.
to privacy) in SG metering network in Section V – VII.
Following Section V – VII, we provide comprehensive reviews
of various schemes (with their pros and cons) that have
been proposed to enhance security in the SG networks, while
maintaining privacy in Section VIII – X. In Section XI, we
discuss open (research) issues that need to be explored for the
future directions and conclusions are drawn in Section XII.
II. BACKGROUND OF SMART GRID METERING NETWORKS
The overall success of a SG and its emerging paradigms
are mainly fostered by the advanced metering infrastructure
(AMI) or smart metering infrastructure (SMI). Note that AMI
and SMI are used interchangeably. The SMI not only improves
the value added services for the customers, but also develops
the remote control functionality from the utility side (i.e.,
control center) to smart meters. Moreover, the SMI could lead
the opportunities to make plug-in hybrid electric vehicles to
vehicle-to-grid application as the distributed renewable energy
sources. As shown in Fig. 3, the SG metering network is a wide
network and it consists of several technologies, as follows.
A. Smart Meter – Consumer side
The SG is assumed to be incorporated with a variety of
smart functionalities, e.g., dynamic pricing, demand response,
outage notification, power connect/disconnect, theft detection,
communication with other smart devices and so on [32] [28].
To accomplish these functionalities, a smart meter plays one
of the important roles. Note that the SMI is not only limited
to smart electricity meters, but it also includes smart gas
and water meters. A smart meter is typically installed at the
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consumer’s premises for measuring, storing, displaying and
transmitting the energy uses to the utility companies. However,
a latest smart meter is integrated with the following metrology
computation blocks, as follows. (i) It comprises of solid state
electronic (hardware and software), essentially integrated with
a micro-controller system with inbuilt memory that stores
energy consumption readings, performs post-processing, and
manages control commands and/or alert messages. (ii) An
analog to digital converter provides an instantaneous footprint
of energy uses and power factor. It can also measure the phase
current and voltage. (iii) In order to connect with external
devices, a smart meter is usually integrated with several inter-
face units, e.g., universal asynchronous receiver transmitter,
and serial peripheral. (iv) A display unit is a regulatory
requirement that an end-user can see the consumption report
for the billing and energy controlling purposes. (v) A real
time clock (RTC) provides tariff information in the duration
of an hour, a day, a month and a year for data analysis,
billing and demand-response purposes. Moreover, the RTC
can be utilized in wireless network for the time synchronous
purposes. (vi) Communication: a smart meter is enabled with
two-way communication capability (via wireless/wire-line)
for transmitting meter data to the utility, and for receiving
control commands from the utility. Alternatively, a smart meter
may connect with a communication hub that further connects
the appliances within a home and the outer world via the
communication networks, as discussed in Section II.B.
B. Smart Grid Metering Communication Networks
A communication network is an enabling technology in
order to realize the SG metering networks. As depicted in
Fig. 3, a communication network can be divided into following
three classical networks.
B.1 Home Area Network (HAN)
From the utility perspective, the HAN is a group of
appliances, entertainment systems, lighting systems, energy
storage and generation (solar, wind etc.), electric vehicles.
In addition, a home display together a controller provides
an interactive user interface which uses for energy control
and device maintenance purposes. Within the HAN, a smart
meter acts as a home gateway that collects energy consumption
reading, sends collected readings to control data center and
executes control commands that are received from the utility.
In a typical HAN, the information flows between the smart
meter and appliances are not continuous, therefore, each device
data rate may vary from 10 to 100 Kbps. The data rate
also depends on the number of devices and their distances.
Therefore, assuming small distances in the HAN, wireless
technologies can be one of the potential solutions that provide
many features, e.g., automatic network configuration. Few of
home automation technologies are as follows: IEEE 802.15.4
(e.g., ZigBee and Zwave [33]), operates at 2.4 GHz, data rate
up to 250 Kbps, and covers up to 50 m. The potential merits of
IEEE 802.15.4 include wireless communication, low cost, low
power consumption and the flexibility. The demerits of IEEE
802.15.4 are as follows: (i) IEEE 802.15.4 does not provide
enough security like WiFi based secure system, and (ii) IEEE
802.15.4 supported devices have low bandwidth [28] so that
they cannot be useful in high stream multimedia data.
Another prominent HAN technology is IEEE 802.11 (WiFi),
data rate up to 54 Mbps and it can cover up to 300 m. The mer-
its are low-cost deployment and high flexibility. The demerits
of IEEE 802.11 are high interference and power consumptions.
In addition, following the technical specifications from [34],
the advanced smart meters shall be integrated with both IEEE
802.15.4 and IEEE 802.11.
B.2 Meter Local Area Network (MLAN)
The meter local area network refers to communication
between the smart meter and the data concentrator. The
MLAN network is mainly located: (i) at the energy distribution
domain, which comprises of the data concentrators, and (ii)
at the field area networks including many automated devices,
e.g., monitors, re-closers, switches, capacitor controllers, etc.
MLAN typically communicates over the powerline com-
munication (PLC) which uses existing wireline connections to
6send data from one node to other nodes. The PLC operates
at two different data rates called, narrowband PLC (NB-PLC)
and broadband PLC (BB-PLC). The NB-PLC can send up to
500 Kbps, operate at 500 kHz frequency and cover up to 150
km distance. Whereas BB-PLC can send up to 200 Mbps,
operate at 2 – 30 MHz, and cover up to 1.5 km. Currently, in
many countries (e.g., Italy, France, Britain and China) a PLC
based technology has been the main choice for communication
between the smart meters and data concentrators. The main
merits of PLC are low cost, ubiquitous nature, and low de-
ployment cost as it can make use of available communication
infrastructure. The demerits of PLC are as follows: higher
signal loss, interference and complex routing.
In the SMI, wireless mesh network has been proposed
and deployed widely. Each smart mesh meter collects own
data and becomes a router for other smart meters to send
consumption usage data to the data concentrator. A mesh
network can operate up to 900 MHz through unlicensed
radio. The Internet is used to connect the smart metering
mesh network to the distributed data concentrators which
are usually located few kilometers away. Moreover, a mesh
network can be a self-formed and self-healed network that
can easily tolerate the network faults. For instance, when one
smart meter can no longer operate, the rest of the meters can
still communicate with each other either directly or through
one or more intermediate meters. The main merits of mesh
network are as follows: it provides cost effective solution
with dynamic self-organization, self-healing, and significant
scalability services. The demerits of mesh network are network
fading and interference. Each smart mesh meter needs to send
messages and acts as a router, which causes high complexity
of each smart meter to go up high.
B.3 Wide Area Network (WAN)
In the SG metering network, a WAN is known as the
highest-level network that provides connectivity between mul-
tiple data concentrators and the utility control center. The
WAN is also recognized as a core network through which
enormous SMI data, control commands and signals are trans-
mitted and received. In order to provide communication in
WAN, several potential technologies can be employed, e.g.,
IEEE 802.16 (i.e., WiMAX), IEEE 802.20 (MobileFi), PLC,
IEEE 802.11 (WiFi) and IEEE 802.15.4 (ZigBee).
The viability of WiMAX for Smart Grid Last Mile (SGLM)
communication is shown in [35]–[37]. It provides data rate up
to 128 Mbps for downlink and 28 Mbps for uplink, and covers
up to 48 km. As shown in [38], WiMAX can provide real-time
connectivity, control and a high speed communication with low
latency to support multimedia services as an effective facility
to mobile workers in SG metering networks.
MobileFi (IEEE 802.20) is a mobile broadband wireless
access technology that ensures the reliability, low latency,
and high bandwidth. In addition, MobileFi can provide high
mobility up to vehicular speed of 250 kmph and can transmit
variable real time data from 1 Mbps to 20 Mbps. The MobileFi
can be deployed in substation monitoring, and electric vehicle
charging system through the distributed renewable generation.
More details on the recent communication technologies for the
SG can be found in [39]–[46].
C. Meter Data Management System (MDMS)
In the SG metering network, typically information are
collected via the communication technologies from the con-
sumers’ systems (i.e., smart meters). These information are
stored to the utility servers, also called meter data management
system (MDMS).
The collected data allows various activities in a power
grid, e.g., network controlling and monitoring, operational
management, billing, etc. For more details, please refer to [23],
[27], [47]–[49].
D. Advanced applications in SG metering network
The SMI enables various enhanced applications in the
energy distribution automation system (i.e., accurate modelling
of load information [50], [51]), and data management system.
Examples of advanced applications in SMI are as follows.
D.1 Demand Response using SG metering network
Through the load management systems, the utility compa-
nies can detect peak load demand and control them via the
demand-response (DR) program. In DR programs, the SM
enables a customer to act as an active participant in overall grid
load management via controlling energy use within the HAN
[52], [53]. Consumers wish to voluntarily lower their normal
consumption either during the peak time network congestion
or based on the events when energy prices are high [52].
Nevertheless, the successful implementation of a DR pro-
gram relies upon an efficient two-way communication system
between the DR consumer and the utility. A generic DR
architecture is shown in Fig. 4.
• The utility first defines a DR event – the peak-time
when customers’ electricity demands need to be shifted
(from on-peak to off-peak times) depending on their
preferences. Then, a DR-request packet including dy-
namic price signals is sent from the DR automation
server (DRAS) to the DR customer via the SG metering
network.
• The end-users who intend to alter the timing (or wish
to reduce electricity consumption), communicate back to
the utility with their DR-response packet including their
requested price, load shift and timing.
• Home energy management system (HEMS): In a home,
the HEMS system is a (software and hardware) system
that is accountable for managing and controlling several
functionalities, e.g., utility bill tracking, real-time meter-
ing, equipment management, and so on.
D.2 Outage Notification using SG metering network
Many SG systems enable the endpoints to send a “last gasp”
message to utility to inform that an outage has happened in
a SM and it is out of power. Such a function can help the
whole grid system efficiently respond to the outage condition.
Fig. 5 shows the sequence diagram, describing how such last
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gasp transmission functionality works. There are four entities
involved in the outage notification scenarios:
• Network Interface Component (NIC): The entity rep-
resents network interface to endpoint metering device.
• AMI Network: The entity represents the network of
AMI, which is responsible for measuring, collecting, an-
alyzing energy usage, and communicating with metering
devices.
• Outage Filter (OF): The entity provides filtering in-
formation for the “last gasp” information from AMI to
Outage Management System, which helps to filter noise
and short-term outages.
• Outage Management System (OMS): The entity is a
system used to improve the response to reported outages
and expedite power restoration of the homes.
In Fig. 5, the entities interact with each other to fulfill
the goal of outage notification as follows. NIC can detect
a zero voltage (i.e., loss of voltage) in some smart meters.
Afterwards, it sends a last gasp information to SMI Network
and AMI Network routes the OF (step 1, 2). When OF receives
the transmitted data, it filters the data according to specific
filtering rules (step 3). If the data is valid after applying
filtering rules, the OF sends a message to OMS (step 4).
Finally, OMS updates the received messages and updates
the status of the corresponding device (step 5).
III. ATTACKS IN THE POWER SECTOR AND SMART
METERING NETWORKS
As the popularity of vulnerabilities on the power grids has
been risen during past few years, it is necessary to briefly
elaborate the real-world attack incidents in energy sectors. In
addition, we discuss the serious consequences caused by the
insecurity on energy network, for instance energy companies,
renewable energy resources, and customer side SMI.
A. Attacks on energy companies
The energy company is considered as one of the most
vulnerable critical infrastructures. For instance, on December
23, 2015, three Ukrainian power distribution companies known
as “Oblenergos” experienced coordinated cyberattacks that
resulted in a power blackout in the region [55]. The attack im-
pacted approximately 250,000 customers and lasted blackout
for several hours. The attack began through a phishing email
containing a malware-rigged attachment (e.g., documents and
excel sheets). When users opened the Word Documents and
Excel spreadsheets in the companies’ business network, the
dropped BlackEnergy3 malware will lurk around and that
steals legitimate user credentials. It is believed that during the
attack, the attackers have stolen the VPN secret parameters
to control the ICS network. Moreover, the electronic media
reported that the attackers remotely accessed the tools to
control the HMI and pulled the breakers [62]. Precisely, the
VPNs appear to lack of robust authentication, e.g., two-factor
or three-factor authentication. The attackers can use a variety
of common techniques to infiltrate the energy companies’
systems, such as KillDisk malware that deletes selected files on
computer systems and renders systems inoperable. Moreover,
the attacker uploaded a malicious framework via communica-
tion channels to the gateway devices at substations to knock
the system down [26]. Once again on December 17, 2016,
Ukrain suffered from another power outage, which is also
attributed to the cyberattacks [19], [20].
Candid Wueest [56] reported that a division/section of the
Austrian and German power grid was unexpectedly misdi-
rected via a control command which results the power grid
nearly knock down. In this case, a status request query (i.e.,
test command) was mistakenly forwarded/transmitted from
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SUMMARY OF RECENT VULNERABILITIES LEADING TO REAL-WORLD CYBERATTACK INCIDENTS
Targeted entities Cyber vulnerabilities
Ukrainian power distribution Authentication violated, malicious framework uploaded, VPN credential stolen [55]
Austrian and German power grid A control command misdirected that led to distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) [56]
Renewable energy A remote attacker can reach out solar panels and SMs and spoof (network) configurations and meter parameters [57]
Renewable energy A remote attacker can inject malicious script to the 442SR wind turbine [58]
Smart metering A puppet attack can result to potential denial of service (DoS) attack and other routing attack in wireless mesh nodes [59]
Smart metering Reverse engineering may lead to electricity usage fraud or may lead to other privacy concerns about the individuals [60]
Smart metering Compromising smart meter communication can lead to monetary effects [61]
a newly installed Germany gas plant network, finding its
way to the Austrian energy power control and monitoring
network systems. Moreover, the query produced too many
response messages, which yielded even more data queries
that successively flooded the control network. Such queries
are also called self-inflicted distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attack. However, to freeze this attack, the division
of the monitoring and control system had to be separated and
disconnected. Similarly, there are various types of cyberattack
incidents (e.g., stuxnet, night dragon and shamoon/disttack)
that target different CIs. More details can be found in [56].
B. Attacks on renewable energy resources
Locus Energy offers solar panels based renewable energy
systems. However, in 2016, a command injection vulnerability
in energy solar panels was reported in ICSA-16-231-01 [57].
The research reported that a remote attacker with low skill can
not only exploit a (PHP) vulnerability to reach out solar panels
and smart meters but he/she can spoof the network configu-
rations and meter’s parameters out. However, to mitigate this
vulnerability, the company has produced a firmware update for
almost 100K devices.
XZERES is an energy company which mainly maintains and
provides wind turbine based renewable energy systems. How-
ever, two independent researchers identified the vulnerabilities
in a system called “442SR wind turbine”. They claimed that
by injecting malicious scripts, the 442SR wind turbine can be
remotely controlled [58]. Similarly, other renewable resources
vulnerabilities are reported for the wind turbine in ICSA-15-
162-01A [63], the eSolar Light in ICSA-15-160-02 [64]. More
research on cyber security assessment of distributed energy
resources can be found in [65].
C. Attacks on Metering networks
As reported in [59], the AMI may be utilized as an entry
point to damage network functionality in the power grid. Yi
et al. discovered a new cyber threat (called puppet attack)
for the smart meters [59]. The attack can cause a denial
of service (e.g., packet flooding, and resource exhaustion –
in the terms of energy and bandwidth) for smart meters
using wireless mesh network topology. Precisely, in the AMI
network, a normal node can be selected as a puppet node,
which is mainly controlled by an attacker. This puppet node
not only receives packets from the neighbouring nodes, but it
can flood bogus packets to AMI network. Such bogus packets
can exhaust the bandwidth and the node energy. The authors
claimed that the puppet attack is more difficult to detect than a
flooding attack. Consequently, the AMI network performance
can drop seriously down. As described by the authors, this
newly discovered puppet attack has the ability to cause a
“collapse of the network” and it is “hard to discover the
malicious node”.
At the Black Hat Europe conference of 2014, Alberto and
Javier proved blatant security weaknesses of smart meters.
The authors argued that by exploiting the reverse engineering,
meters can be shutdown and/or an electricity consumption
theft and fraud can be performed over the power line com-
munication networks [60]. In addition, Alberto and Javier also
claimed that by exploiting the hardware, an attacker can get
the encryption keys (e.g., a master key). Then anyone can have
full network control over a big area, i.e., to turn on/off lights
remotely. A malicious user can use the master key to obtain
the power consumption information of a neighbouring house
(to determine) “if someone is in the house”. Such information
leakage can certainly raise privacy issues.
Tellbach-Li presented cyber-attacks on smart meters in a
household nanogrid [61]. The authors developed and simulated
a network model for a nanogrid, which is closed to a real-
world scenario. The model includes a complete household with
the SM and the nanogrid. In this study, several cyber-attacks
were mounted into the SM to study the effects of different
attacks on a household nanogrid. Tellback-Li’s claimed that by
compromising SMs communications, integrity, confidentiality
and availability, attacks can cause monetary effects on the
grid. Finally, Table III summarized the list above mentioned
incidents.
Lessons: It can be noticed that with the growing usage of
ICT, the energy sectors become vulnerable to security and
privacy attacks. The lack of adequate protection against coor-
dinated attacks could be catastrophic. For instance, the attack
incidents on energy companies, renewable energy resources
and metering networks serve as prominent instances to demon-
strate the significant consequences in energy networks. Such
vulnerabilities can also impact in many ways, ranging from
benign disruption to act of sabotage, threatening individual
live to economic fraud and even more the national security
threats. Moreover, these attacks point the urgency to improve
the resilience of next-generation power grid where a massive
number of heterogeneous smart meters, sensors, and control
systems will be inter-connected via several technologies.
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IV. THREAT MODELING AND TAXONOMY, AND SECURITY
AND PRIVACY GOALS IN SG METERING NETWORKS
Following Fig. 3, the SG metering network favors the
interoperability and remote management and control of several
entities, including consumers, data concentrator systems, etc.
These entities unfortunately might be vulnerable to various
cybersecurity attacks. The inter-connectivity of those entities,
together with their inherent constraints, enables several threat
vectors targeting the SG metering network systems, services,
applications, etc. The threat vector defines a procedure that a
threat agent used to cripple down the target. This section first
defines the threat model, and then presents the threat taxonomy
in SG metering networks. Finally, we point out the security and
privacy requirements that can be considered in the designing
of SG metering networks.
A. Threat modeling in SG Metering Networks
In order to understand the threats in SG metering network,
we must briefly discuss the involved entities, and examine their
interactions for mounting attacks. Fig. 6 shows the high-level
adversary model, including adversaries, vulnerabilities and
targets. The threat model followed in this paper is conceptually
adopted from [30].
A.1 The Adversary
The adversary is a threat agent (or a group of agents) that
aims to cause substantial harm to a target system by exercising
powerful attacks. A threat agent may include hackers, cyber-
criminals, legitimate consumers, etc. As shown in Fig. 6, an
active or passive attacker can be modelled as follows.
1) Required access to SG metering network: It means that
what type of access to SG metering network is required, for
instance physical access or logical access, to mount an attack.
In physical access, if an attacker has direct access to the
target systems then we call it an insider. More precisely, an
insider can have direct access to the proximity of a system and
that may be enough to mount an attack. On the contrary, if an
attacker that has no direct physical access to a target system
then we call it outsider. An outsider can gain knowledge by
tampering other devices to mount the attack.
In logical access, an attacker can connect logically to
the target systems via the available insecure components or
interfaces (e.g., open ports). These components might be
inherently vulnerable to threats [66].
2) Required resource: To mount an attack, the required
capabilities mean the ability to use the resources, e.g., high
resources (such as advanced equipments) or low resources
(such as cheap devices). In addition, other factors include
technical skills (e.g., expert or non-expert), knowledge, and
time, to exercise the attack.
3) motivations/intentions: The motivation of attackers is typ-
ically include: (a) intended to cause disruption or destruction
of SG metering network systems (we call it strong motivation);
(b) gain access to the system that benefits to adversary, e.g.,
energy theft threat, financial losses; and (c) the fact that an
attacker may have different intentions, such as intend to know
the life pattern of the individuals and whether the property is
occupied or not. All these intentions lead to privacy issues.
A.2 Vulnerabilities in SG metering network
In the SG metering network, a number of heterogeneous
systems will be deployed. In our modeling, the system (e.g.,
smart meter, gateway, router, sensors, and so on) is one of
the facilitators of the attack. In most of studies (e.g., [59],
[60], [61]), a system is one of the weakest points in a threat
chain, and is an entry point for the attacker. An adversary
can explore and detect plenty of the weakest links/features
of a target system to mount the attacks on SG metering
network. Few of these weakest links can be regarded as
follows, embedded vulnerabilities, application vulnerabilities,
and network vulnerabilities.
1) Vulnerabilities in the embedded systems: In [60], [61],
a number of vulnerabilities in the embedded hardware have
been reported in SG metering systems, e.g., lack of tamper
protection, weak encryption module and algorithm, hardware
design flaws, etc. In addition, numbers of embedded software
flaws have been discussed in the smart metering systems, such
as bugs in [67], [68], malware and lack of software update in
[69]. Utilizing these software vulnerabilities, an attacker can
pose huge impacts on the smart metering network, and on the
consumers, e.g., a black out in home.
2) Vulnerabilities in the applications: An application deals
with metering data management and other value added services
(e.g., automated billing and demand response program) for the
consumers. However, exploiting software flaws and accidental
misconfiguration, an attacker may lead to cyber threat, e.g.,
inappropriate data delivery scheduling from millions of smart
meters, as discussed in [70].
3) Vulnerabilities in the networks: In SG metering network,
a device (including meter, gateway, and/or router) is connected
via the network and communication protocols. However, the
network level protocols can be explored to mount many of
attacks, as demonstrated in [59]. As an example, numbers of
networking and communication protocols, e.g., IEEE 802.11.x
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( i.e., mesh network, WiFi), IEEE 804.15.4x (i.e., ZigBee,
Zwave, etc.) are reported to contain security vulnerabilities
[71], [72]. A recent study reveals how an attacker can exploit
compromised smart meters to inject, modify, delete data, to the
gateway or router in SG metering network [73]. In addition, the
lack of key management techniques of symmetric keys and/or
public keys in the network and communication protocols
completely exposure to the attacks (e.g., no data integrity, no
confidentiality and lack of authentication).
A.3 The targets in SG metering networks
Exploiting the aforementioned vulnerabilities, an attacker
may target the actual targets but not limited to, e.g., customers,
service providers, and market. Nevertheless, the actual target
and attack may depend on an attacker’s motivation and/or in-
tention. In the SG metering networks, the targets are typically
interconnected with the heterogeneous systems via the network
and communication technologies. In our high-level threat
model (refer to Fig. 6), we regard the interconnection between
the systems and targets, as direct connectivity, and indirect
connectivity [30]. Based on the connections, an attacker may
exercise an attack to a target, as follows.
1) Direct connectivity between a system and target: In
this attack, a system and target both together have a direct
connection, such as physical and/or logical connections. If a
system is installed in a physically secured premisses (e.g., a
smart meter, which is installed in a building area network),
then it can be referred as a direct physical connection between
a system and target. Whereas, if a system is installed inside
or outside in a physically secured premisses then it can
be referred as a direct logical connection. For instance, a
router/gateway may be installed either inside or outside in a
physically secured location in the NAN [74].
2) Indirect connectivity between a system and target: To
enable novel business models, the metering network requires
new transformations, for instance “bring your own device
(BYOD)” policies. Precisely, the consumer may buy and install
(untested) demand-side response ready systems (e.g., smart
thermostat) from an untrusted manufacturer [75]. However,
such a system may connect with a target in an indirect and non
obvious way. This indirect connection path can pose high risk,
and can be used to mount the attack on advanced applications,
such as demand response programs.
B. Threat Taxonomy in SG Metering Networks
Based on the attack model over multiple entities and their
inter-connections via communication technologies (as shown
in Fig. 3), we grouped the threat taxonomy into mainly three
categories, as shown in Fig. 7 [76], [77]:
• Threats to system-level security: An attacker may attempt
to take down (partially or fully) the SG metering network.
For details refer to Section V. The countermeasures for
threats to system-level security are presented in Section
VIII.
• Threat or theft to services: An adversary may aim to steal
services in the SG metering applications, such as billings,
etc. For details refer to Section VI. The countermeasures
for threat or theft to services are presented in Section IX.
TABLE IV
LATENCY ASSOCIATED WITH APPLICATIONS [80]
Time latency Applications
≤ 4ms Protective relaying (to detect defective circuits)
Subseconds To monitor device state in WAN
Seconds Controlling substation, and feeder management
Minutes Continuous checking uncritical device and pricing
Hours Energy usage unit and wholesale-market pricing
Days Long-term monitoring (e.g., microgrid information)
• Threats to privacy: An attacker may intent to target to
compromise the confidentiality of consumers’ sensitive
data over insecure systems or networks. For details refer
to Section VII. The countermeasures for threats to privacy
are presented in Section X.
C. Security and privacy goals in SG Metering Networks
C.1 Security goals
The SG metering network is a mission critical infrastructure
– consisting of major elements, such as information technology
(IT), ICS and communication infrastructures. These elements
are being employed to send command information across
the energy networks, and to report usage/consumption, price,
billing, and DR programs among the energy companies and
end-consumers. The SG metering network therefore requires
new expansions and methodologies to deal with the IT, ICS
and network infrastructure and their incorporation with the
physical devices, machines, equipments and end-consumers
[78]. This paper points out following security goals that should
be considered from the early design of SG metering network.
Note that the goals are directly adopted from [21], [79]–[81].
• Availability: Based on consumption usage data (i.e., SM)
in the HAN, the utility supplier’s is now able to balance
and manage the bulk generation and consumption. In this
regard, the SMs reports are significantly important for the
energy feedback purposes [82]. Therefore, the availability
of SMs data has become crucial for the SG metering
network reliability. Note that availability requirements
may vary based on the applications, such as the protective
relaying requires ≤ 4 ms (time) latency to detect defective
lines and circuits. Therefore, data availability is one of
main design goals in the SG metering network. Table IV
summarizes the applications that require different time
latency [80] or data availability.
• Integrity: A SM typically sends consumption data pe-
riodically to the utility servers via data concentrators.
Though the data concentrator may be physically secured
from an outside access, its various interfaces with other
entities make it vulnerable to be attacked. Integrity pro-
vides assurance that the data and control commands have
not been altered or modified without authorization. A loss
of integrity will cause destruction of information, and
will lead to incorrect decision regarding controlling and
managing the SG metering network.
• Confidentiality: It is a security dimension which analyses
whether some specific data should be shielded from
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being disclosed by unauthorised entities. It is the least
critical dimension when considering grid communications
reliability but a very important one for end consumers.
Confidentiality is intrinsically linked to the privacy of
end-customers, as consumption usage data can reveal the
life pattern of individuals. At the utility servers, therefore
consumption usage data shall be kept confidential.
• Authentication or identification: SG metering network
comprises of millions of entities. Therefore, there is an
immense need for making sure that someone or some-
thing really is who or what claims to be. Authentication
or identification is a logical method for proving the
legitimacy and identification of an entity, such as end-
user, meter, etc. A SG metering application must be
integrated with a strong authentication mechanism that
can identify and discard unauthorized connections and
commands. In addition, an authentication scheme should
also meet the high-efficiency, tolerant to attacks, and
support multicast in the SG metering [24].
• Non-repudiation: Considering the vast scale of SG me-
tering network, non-repudiation property can detect that
an individual had performed some false actions, for
example, energy theft by the consumers, and now he/she
denies to take the responsibility of the action.
• Access control: Numerous stakeholders will share con-
sumption usage data, which depends on the interest of
their applications, such as demand supply, load manage-
ment, etc. However, these stakeholders are required to
enforce adequate authorization policies, so that customers
data can not be accessed without permission [83].
• Accountability and auditing: Periodic accountability
and auditing are paramount requirements to further val-
idate the security mechanisms for the SG metering net-
work systems. Despites, there may exist some security
breaches but the periodic accountability procedure will
help out to detect who is responsible for that breach.
Essentially, for the thorough analysis of the SG metering
network and their information systems, accountability
will make the systems accountable and traceable [84].
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Noteworthy, in a SG, security goals have different priorities
for the different domains, e.g., ICS (i.e., grid automation and
control system) and ICT (i.e., general purpose systems – smart
metering), as depicted in Fig. 8. To ensure the operational
reliability in SG, the priority order is AIC (i.e., availability,
integrity and confidentiality). Availability and integrity are
given the highest priority goals because ICS systems are
main driving forces for the grid automation, human and
equipment safety, and environmental impacts. On the contrary,
confidentiality is at the top priority in the general purpose ICT
processes or in the AMI network. The common known fact is
that the consumption usage data is sensitive for an individual,
since it can provide knowledge about individual’s habits, e.g.,
if someone is on the vacations or watching TV.
C.2 Privacy goals
In the SG metering network, many of devices (e.g., meters,
sensors, actuator, etc.) exchanges their messages across the
grid infrastructure via the communication technology and
protocol. However, such devices significantly expand huge
amount of messages (e.g., control commands, consumption
data, and other relevant information) in the different domain
in SG, as shown in Fig. 1. For an analogy, the energy suppliers
currently collect one month reading per consumer/home. If
they start collecting consumption information each minute,
the monthly reading per consumer will expend to over 43,000
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readings. Indeed, the expanded readings from the consumers
help to improve an even distribution among the energy pro-
duction and consumption, but also bring an array of privacy
concerns. For instance, within a given home or other property
(i.e., building), the smart metering data will give much more
precise picture on individual behaviour, activities, and the time
patterns associated with the individual activities. Moreover,
the fine-grained energy consumption usage data may even
show the total number of personnels in a home or building,
which could also reveal the pattern of when the property is
empty or occupied. Therefore, the main question is how the
consumption usage data can be collected without revealing the
privacy of individuals and still be able to useful for practical
purposes, e,g., billings, demand-supply, and other operations.
Note that this subsection will focus on the communication
privacy in SG metering network. This paper discusses the
following properties for privacy, which are directly adopted
from [85]–[88].
• Anonymity: As shown in literature – “Anonymity is the
state of being not identifiable within a set of subjects, the
anonymity set” [89]. Privacy properties such as consumer-
to-utility anonymity aim to make an entity anonymous
from others, even from a peer.
• Unlinkability: In this, the data/information are not suf-
ficiently linkable among two entities in a system. From
the broad perspective, unlinkability is paramount property
that needs to be implemented at different level such as,
home area network (smart meter, sensor, home gateway,
etc.) and field area network (i.e., data concentrator and
substations that are located in cloud or SG servers) [86].
• Undetectability: From a SG metering network perspec-
tive, entities (e.g., machine, device, equipment, data, ap-
plication, user) or their information/data could be an inter-
est of a malicious user/adversary to detect or infer knowl-
edge about the entity or data. Therefore, the item/data
should be undetectable to the adversary. Furthermore, the
undetectability property can be further divided into two
forms: zero undetectability and maximum undetectability.
For the details, readers may refer to [90].
• Unobservability: With this property, an outside observer
cannot tell whether communication takes place or not
– i.e., an uninvolved entity (e.g., an outside observer)
cannot sufficiently distinguish whether a targeted entity
(smart meter) had executed certain messages or other
actions on interest, for instance, sending consumption
messages, demand-bidding messages, paying bills, or
logging in.
• Pseudonymity: “A pseudonym is an identifier of a subject
which is different from the subject’s real names” [89].
In grid communication, many stakeholders can access
the consumption data from the smart meters, therefore, a
smart meter must have several identifiers (i.e., pseudon-
mity). These identifiers only be possessed by the ded-
icated entities those are communicating or exchanging
messages with the smart meter.
V. THREATS TO SYSTEM LEVEL SECURITY IN SG
METERING NETWORK
In a SG metering network, smart meters are to be installed
on the individual premises that will likely be part of the
AMI network. A smart meter transmits/receives data and many
other pieces of sensitive information among the dedicated data
concentrators, control centers, and customers. However, an
attack on system level security can take down a part of or
the whole power grid. For example, assume a SG metering
network as shown in Fig. 3 – a malicious agent or a group of
agents (e.g., insider or outsider) may try to alter the program
instructions in smart meters, and deliberately modify alarm
thresholds. Such agents may send an unofficial signal (e.g.,
a disconnect meter command) impersonating the utility to the
millions of smart meters or to other load control devices in the
energy grid. These attempts may result in damage to machine,
unusual shut-off of power operations or even crippling of
control equipment. In the SG model (see Fig. 1), such attacks
may influence the roles of Customer, Service Provider and
Operations. As depicted in the threat taxonomy in SG metering
network (refer to Fig. 7), the threats to system-level security
can be further divided into followings:
A. Radio subversion or takeover
This threat aims to control/take one or more radio channels
to intercept RF communication modules, so that the inter-
cepted radio channels “belong” to the attacker. As shown in
Fig. 3, the smart meter or data center and/or data concentrator
talks wirelessly utilizing various means of communication
technologies. Over the wireless radio, an attacker can manip-
ulate the smart meter dynamics in order to inject malicious
code (e.g., control command/firmware). For instance, at the
consumer side, the manipulated control command might effect
mainly meter’s metrology board. If a control command/alert
message is replaced with the malicious intention, then an
attacker can attempt to jeopardize the availability of devices
by flooding further fake commands at large scale, such as,
home appliances or other devices. By doing this an attacker
can takeover on homes, buildings, and societies. Moreover, if
an attacker takes control on radio communication, he/she will
be able to issue disconnect commands (again and again) to
millions of meters since there is no adequate way of checking
the authenticity and integrity of these commands [91], [92].
Considering the grid side, the recent real incident on the
Ukrainian power revealed that the attacker uploaded a mali-
cious framework to the gateway devices at substations in order
to knock the system down [55]. Such threats can have serious
financial implications for the end-users, utilities, and other
entities in the SG metering network [93]. Consequently, this
threat (i.e., radio subversion) is assumed to be highly severe
(e.g., loss of availability and integrity), since unauthorized
entity can takeover either on grid side or on consumer side,
or on both side together.
B. Credential compromise
In order to harm the SG metering network, the cyber crim-
inals can obtain large volumes of credentials for the purpose
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of system control at the utility side. For example, in the
Ukrainian power cyber attack, it is believed that the attacker
compromised/stole VPN’s (weak) credentials and reached the
ICS, and remotely accessed the tools to control the HMI [62].
Here, the weak credentials means weak authentications, poor
access control policies defined and weak passwords that might
have been used to break the system. Typically, credentials
check the legitimacy of identity of an entity on the network and
system, and then let that entity access communication network,
such as, VPN, access point, communication module/meter and
operation and management system [76]. The compromised
systems’ credentials, therefore, enable an attacker to plan
coordinated attacks on the weakest link of the power plants.
Consequently, blackout the societies are potentially high risks
on the national security, and so on. The impact of this threat
can be catastrophic or higher.
C. Availability compromises at back office
Consider the utility side network (please refer to Fig. 3), a
perpetrator (e.g., insider or outsider) would take illegal access
to computers by exploiting social engineering attacks (i.e.,
this also known as back office compromise). For instance,
according to the Wall Street Journal, cyberspies have ever
gained access to the U.S. electrical grid computers. Moreover,
the attackers left out (malicious) software programs that could
be exploited for one or more threats, as reported by the current
and former national-security officials [94]. In a recent attack
on the Ukrainian power distribution companies, as the official
documents and spreadsheets, when clicked or opened, dropped
a BlackEnergy3 malware, as reported in [55]. The tremendous
capabilities of malwares, such as BlackEnergy3 and KillDisk,
may pose major necessary threats (e.g., information leakage,
access control violation) to corrupt or overwrite the master
boot records, databases, power control servers and so on. As
a consequence, the impact could be catastrophic or high and
may lead to financial losses.
D. Network barge-in by unknown
In the SG metering network (Fig. 3), different entities
usually exchange messages and/or information via the single-
hop or multi-hop communications. For instance, (i) consumer
side: a smart meter forwards consumption usage via single
or multipath routing to the upper layers; (ii) grid side –
load management program: a demand response (DR) manager
sends DR signal via multi hop communication (using relay
node) to the end-users, as shown in Fig 4. For single or
multihop communications, wireless relay nodes are used to
exchange the information/control commands in AMI network.
Usually these relay nodes are unguarded. Routing data there-
fore through the public network (i.e., relay node) is considered
one of the weakest point (or anomalous activity point) to
be attacked. It is possible that a rogue relay node can make
available for absolute access to the adversary who may aim for
anomalous activities, such as message modification, man-in-
the-middle and packet analysis threats [59]. Such anomalous
activity can disrupt or mislead the communication modules
at the utility to meet the varying demand of the end-users
(i.e., house, factory, and so on) without being detected. For
example: (i) for the personal interest, an ill-intention adversary
(a factory rival) may set up a rogue communication module
in the smart metering network routing path to piggyback
radio traffic (requested energy) from the factory side over the
mesh network infrastructure. (ii) Malevolent user attempts to
disrupt communication modules via unofficial (transmission or
reception) channels or uses an “unknown” routing to intercept
(e.g., puppet attack [59]) traffic in the SG metering network.
(iii) Typically, the control center sends control commands to
the substations – any tampering with routing either on control
command or packet address can lead to false alarm, system
outage, etc. Moreover, an attacker may undertake to modify
the control command packets to assume a different role, e.g.,
manufacturer of energy, consumer of energy, or distributor of
energy, etc. Such threats may severely effect degradation of
functional capability or may lead to major damage to network
availability and integrity.
E. Denial of Service
In this threat, a malicious activity can weaken or downgrade
the operational performance of the whole SG metering net-
work from its anticipated operations. An attacker can exploit
the inherent vulnerabilities of network at different layers to
take down the communication performance. These threats
result low to high impact in all or part of the network becoming
unserviceable (or unavailable). For instance, a misdirected
control command leads to DoS attacks and about to take down
the Austrian utility network [56]. In [95], Asri-Pranggono
evaluated the impacts of DoS attacks (e.g., flooding attack)
on the AMI network. DoS attacks can be further categorized
as follows.
• Radio frequency (RF) spectrum jamming: The wireless
communication technologies are one of the main compo-
nents in realisation of a SMI. For instance, cognitive radio
(CR) particularly is highly promoted to deploy in the SG
network that can utilize all possible spectrum resources
[41] [109]. However, incorporation of CR technology (at
physical (PHY) layer) in SG will also bring new security
challenges [104] [105]. A recent research [103] proposes
a new attacking strategy (i.e., spoofing and jamming)
in CR network using power distribution by applying
dynamic programming in wireless SG. This research
focuses on attacking at super users (SUs) and reduces
SU’s spectrum availability and transmission performance.
In addition, the authors claimed that the attack success
probability in CR technology is always higher within
the power constraint. However, the main objective of
a jamming threat is to jeopardize the communication
among the smart meters and utilities via a radio emitter
device. This is the most common attack on the physical
layer that prevents signal from being received. Typically
these attacks can have two different classes: i) proactive
jamming, it can transmit high-energy noise signals con-
sistently to squeeze a wireless channel completely (i.e.,
whether there is data on the communication channel) and
put all the nodes in non-functioning mode. (ii) reactive
14
TABLE V
SUMMARY OF THREAT TO SYSTEM LEVEL SECURITY IN SG METERING NETWORK
Threat to system level security
Threat Description Security goals compromised Threat impact
Radio subversion
or takeover [91] [92] [96]
An attacker can manipulate SMI dynamics
over the wireless radio through Unauthorized
RF interception, Eavesdropping, Malicious code,
and Replay attack
Availability, authenticity,
availability, integrity,
Authenticity, availability
High
Credential
compromised
[62] [76] [97]
Over insecure metering network, an attacker
can control the systems at grid side via:
Stolen credential, and Integrity violation
Authenticity, access control
Integrity High
Back office
compromise [55] [98]
An insider can misuse smart metering systems
(e.g., computers) by exploiting social engineering
attacks, such as: Illegal access, and Disrupt system
Authenticity, confidentiality
Availability, access control,
accountability
High
Network barge-in
by unknown [59] [99]
Routing SM data through public network (i.e.,
relay node) can cause Traffic analysis, Message
modification, and MITM
Confidentiality
Availability, integrity,
Authenticity
High
Denial
of
Service
threats
[56] [95]
RF Spectrum
[100]–[105]
A jammer can squeeze the SMI network when it
senses an active radio channel is labelled as occupied,
thus cause Jamming, Spoofing, and Delay in delivery
Availability, Integrity
Availability Low to High
Routing
[91] [106]
Routing in SMI is vulnerable to several DoS attacks:
Neglect and Kill packets, Misdirection, Spoofing,
Replay, Control traffic, and MITM
Availability
Availability, integrity
Confidentiality, authenticity
Availability, integrity
Authenticity
Medium to High
Jabbering
[59] [107]
A malfunctioning smart meter can be co-opted to
transmit so much traffic as: Flooding, and
De-synchronization
Availability
Authenticity, availability Low to High
Stack smashing
[108] The application layer of SMI may vulnerable toMemory overload, and System crashing
Authenticity
Availability Low to High
Low - means the limited effect that put down the single entity functionality to minor damage to assets, minor harm to individuals by compromising one or
more security goals. Medium - means the significant adverse effect that degradation of a single entity functional capability to significant damage to assets,
significant harm to individuals by compromising one or more security goals. High - means the severe adverse effect that degradation of a single entity
functional capability to the fairly high damage to infrastructure, substantial financial loss, and major damage to societies by compromising one or more
security goals [21].
jamming, firstly, it keeps silent and overhears on certain
channels. Secondly, once it overhears the wireless mes-
sages are being triggered within the transmission range
then it can launch DoS attack. The active adversary can
firmly squeeze transmission and reception using the high
RF signals, which can deliberately damage the infor-
mation flow in smart metering infrastructure as follows.
Consider a demand response manager initiates a demand
response event for the consumers. In this scenario, (i)
a jammer can squeeze the network when it senses an
active radio channel is labelled as occupied, since a
message (an event) is being sent from a sender (i.e.,
demand response manager); and (ii) the consumer device
(i.e., smart meter) might be deliberately precluded from
receiving event packets that are sent from sender [100].
Consequently, the smart meter (i.e., receiver) always waits
for the data packets. In addition, Namboodiri et al. have
pointed out how a jammer can temporarily/permanently
connect or disconnect AMI messages by spoofing packets
[101]. For WSNs, Yang et al. [102] proposed a novel
attack called “learning-based jamming (LearJam)”. The
LearJam has two-phase design: (i) learning phase, and
(ii) attacking phase. Authors claimed the LearJam can
achieve successful attacks, and can reduce the network’s
throughput considerably. In summary, such RF jamming
attacks can escalate potential damages or endure concerns
to the network performance of two-way communication
in smart metering network.
• Routing attacks: Routing is vulnerable to DoS attack,
e.g., selective forwarding, black hole, etc. For example,
consider the multihop communication in AMI – if a node
is compromised then it can broadcast a “hello” message
and can represent itself as the shortest path to other
nodes. Consequently, all the neighbouring nodes traffic
get directed to the compromised node and thus pose DoS
attack to mislead the meter data. Moreover, Lin et al.
demonstrated if the forged data is injected in the routing
path (by an attacker), it can cause disproportionation
of the demand and supply patterns that will escalate
the prices for the energy distribution – consequently
the energy distribution process will be disrupted [106].
In [91], Kaplantzis-Sekercioglu discussed how selective
forwarding attack can be the interest of attackers. In this
attack, an attacker can include himself/herself (e.g., man-
in-the-middle) in the data flow path of interest. Then the
attacker may choose not to forward selective packets and
drop them to cause a black hole effect in the end-to-
end packet delivery of smart meters or demand response
program. A variant of this attack is that the adversary
only drops packets coming from specific sources (e.g.,
HAN or utility center, referring to Fig. 3) or drops packets
in a random fashion, whilst reliably forwarding other
packets [91]. Another routing threat is to kill packets –
by killing packets (e.g., trip-off/control commands), an
attacker can cause routing to crash or become unavailable.
Moreover, considering a DR program (referring to Fig. 4),
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an attacker can kill the DR program packets/signals so
that the consumers cannot participate to the DR program.
The packet killing threats, thus, can damage the integrity
of the SG metering network. More information on routing
protocols and challenges in power grid network can be
found in [110], [111].
• Jabbering: Jabbering can control end-to-end links. In this
attack, a malicious smart meter is co-opted to transmit
so much traffic (i.e., flooding and de-synchronizing) that
other nodes cannot communicate. For example, Yi et
al. have shown how the flooding attack can severely
downgrade the resources via transmitting fake control
signals, in the smart metering networks [59]. In de-
synchronized attack, a malevolent adversary may disturb
the communication link that has been established among
two legitimate entities (i.e., HAN and utility company
data center, referring to Fig. 3) by re-synchronizing their
transmission. Moreover, this attack is also called puppet
attack, whereby an attacker can act as a puppet node,
and can transmit attack messages. Upon receiving the
attack messages, the puppet node will be firmly taken
over by the adversary. Consequently, the puppet node
floods more messages to the other neighbouring nodes
to take down the network communication performance
and drain the node energy. Moreover, the authors demon-
strated that puppet attack can take down 20-10 % of
message delivery ratio that could be a serious concern
for the SG metering network [59]. Consequently, network
bandwidth and performance can be disturbed. In addition,
it can exhaust the device resources (battery depletion). In
another research [107], Wang et al. discussed transport
layer protocol security implications in the power grid
synchrophasor data communication. More details can be
found in [107].
• Stack smashing: The attack is mainly applicable to the
application layer. It is a procedure – to damage or crash
the application or device’s operating system by the means
of overloading/overwriting the memory buffers with more
(bogus) data as compared to the size of the memory-
buffer (especially in resource hungry devices). Therefore,
the sensitive data will be revealed, lost/corrupted by the
attackers. Moreover, in [108], the authors demonstrated
that software applications in SG domain are potentially
weak such that a room may be opened for DoS attacks.
In Table V, we summarize security goals violated in the
system level threats including their impacts.
VI. THREATS OR THEFT VIA SG METERING SERVICES
In addition to different types of attacks to system level
security against the SG metering network, the energy com-
panies may face other potential threats that can result in the
theft of metering services, as shown in Fig. 7. For instance,
preventing a SG metering network operator from collecting
revenues [76], [112]. In such threats, an individual smart meter
(or a group of smart meters) within a geographical location,
intentionally sends incorrect report of the consumption usage
data to the energy company. Precisely, a customer may reduce
his/her amount to pay in the bill by executing a demand reset
operation after the first number of billing cycles [112]. The
rate of theft seems not too big, although the cumulative effect
on the energy companies will be very significant. From the
perspective of SG model (see Fig. 1), such an attack type can
influence the roles of Customer, Market, Service Provider, and
Operations. The main threats in this category are as follows
[76], [112], [117]:
A. Cloning a smart meter
As the SMs are manufactured by different companies, with
the collaboration of an insider (i.e., employee) – an attacker
can have an opportunity to access the binary image of keys,
IDs, and framework of the smart meter and can clone a
smart meter. Such cloning threats provide adversaries with the
capability of impersonating or masquerading other legal smart
meters. Precisely, with cloning a smart meter, a perpetrator
can change a meter or radio channel ID with the duplicate
copy such that the fabricated meter can lower own electricity
bill or can send zero usage report. Moreover, as reported in
[118], the attacker can sell meter design for own benefits.
Such cloned meter may have low to high impact. For instance,
if a number of cloned meters start sending fake readings to
the utility company then the utility company may have a big
revenue loss [113].
B. Meter module compromise/intrusion
An energy theft (by means of a meter compromise) is
usually referred to as non-technical loss to the utility company
[114]. An attacker can make such theft by meter bypassing,
meter compromising and tampering, and/or defective me-
ters. Moreover, a modern smart meter is integrated with the
communication module, which can be disconnected with an
ill-intention such that the meter stops sending consumption
report to the utility. A perpetrator may attempt to separate
communication module into the pieces in order to shift the
usage information (from higher to lower), to report zero usage
of power or to forge the demand. In another threat, considering
the billing scenario, a mischievous customer can replay the
previous consumption messages to the utilities, to make the
financial loss. As a result, this threat can pose major impact.
Moreover, as the new green energy systems (e.g., solar, wind)
are emerging, the end-users can play an active role as energy
producer and they can sell energy to the utility company when
demands are surpasses the supply. A malevolent consumer can
alter the messages, by the means of increasing and decreasing
the number of green energy units that to be sent (or reversed)
for billing, as reported in [112].
C. Location migration
To make frauds (i.e., message modification, billing frauds,
etc.) in SMI services, one of the possible ways to change the
meter location [115]. For instance, to cut down the reported
consumptions and related (consumption) bills, a malicious
customer can change the meter from a site that asks high usage
price with the meter from a site that takes considerably low
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TABLE VI
SUMMARY OF THREAT OR THEFT OF SERVICES IN SG METERING NETWORK
Threat and/or theft of services
Threat Description Security goals compromised Threat impact
Clone a smart meter
[76] [112] [113]
Clonning a SM may lead to many attacks: Availability, confidentiality
Low to HighImpersonation, Masquerade, and Confidentiality
Malicious code Availability, integrity
Meter module compromise [114]
A compromised SM may utilize to mount: Authenticity
HighReplay attack, and Eavesdropping Authenticity, availability
Location migration [115] [116]
An ill-intention attacker can change SM’s location by: Confidentiality
Low to MediumMessage modification, and/or Traffic analysis Availability, integrity
usage price, as discussed in [76], [116]. In addition, PHEV can
be charged at different locations with malicious intentions. In-
accurate billing or unwarranted service will disrupt operations
of the market.
Table VI summarizes the security goals compromised in
theft of service threats and their impacts.
VII. THREATS TO PRIVACY IN SG METERING NETWORK
Privacy issues are one of the main concerns in the smart me-
tering network. Consider a demand response program where
the smart meter data and demand response (DR) program
signals (e.g., program type including demand-bidding, loca-
tion, etc.) are exchanged over the public networks via two-
way wireless communication. It is highly possible that an
unauthorized user can intercept or alter smart meter messages
(and DR program signals) while the messages/signals are in
transit. In SG metering network, the message alteration or
leakage could have fatal outcomes for the targeted household
that the messages belong to. Such threats therefore can reveal
the personal (identifiable) information to the unauthorized
entities. From the perspective of SG model (see Fig. 1), such
an attack type can influence the roles of Customer, Market,
Service Provider, and Operations.
Table VII summarizes the security goals compromised in
privacy/confidentiality threats and their impacts. The privacy
threats may arise as:
A. Interception/eavesdropping
The most common threat to the individuals’ privacy –
consumption load tracing when the user data in transit [119].
Unauthorized interception on the communication channels
could allow an attacker to intercept wireless packets. For
instance, an attacker (i.e., MITM) may collect consumer’s
electricity usage preference and deduce the consumer’s daily
routine and other personal information. As a result, this
threat may have major impacts (high) on the individual
privacy. As another example, consider a demand response
automation server (as shown in Fig. 4), initiates a DR event
containing program type, date and time of the DR program,
pricing, geo-location, and consumers list via public channel.
By eavesdropping, an adversary can collect such information
and pose serious threats to customer privacy as discussed
in [120]. Eavesdropping on a DR program may not be a
severe issue, because although it is vulnerable to the privacy
threats, eavesdropping on a DR program may not happen
regularly. Nevertheless, such program needs to be protected
from eavesdropping and replay attacks.
B. Forwarding point compromise
Confidential information (e.g., billing and bidding) can be
revealed if a forwarding entity/node (e.g., a data collector
unit) in the network topology (e.g., mesh infrastructure) is
compromised (as shown in [59]). As a consequence, it can for-
ward smart meter packets toward an attacker or unauthorized
individual. Furthermore, such compromised forwarding point
can pose significant impacts to many use cases. For instance,
as shown in Fig. 4, a demand response automation server
sends the system load status program (i.e., a DR event) to
the consumers. The load status program contains many useful
information, such as event identifier, facility identifier, date
and time, shed data in kWh, event type (Day-Ahead or Day-of
[126]), and load for the consumers (heating, ventilation and air
conditioning (HVAC), and so on). However, the compromised
forwarding point can forward such information to unauthorised
node, and can invade privacy of the customers. Moreover, by
exploiting medium access control (MAC) frame address field,
an honest but curious neighbour (i.e., a spoofing attacker),
can deliberately impersonate as the legal forwarding node to
collect consumption usage from the neighbouring meters to
learn their life patterns. To achieve this, an attacker can send
bogus address resolution protocol (ARP) messages to the smart
meters, as discussed in [99].
C. Backhaul IP network interception
Usually, an utility company uses the backhaul IP network
for data aggregation and other operation controls. In the
backhaul network, network configuration vulnerabilities may
be exploited due to the weak authentication. Moreover, an
IP packet can be easily tampered since packet encryption
is optional. Therefore, packet spoofing on the source and
destination addresses, packet disruption, and substation com-
mand resetting, to list a few instances of how devices and
machines can be misconfigured at the network and transport
layers. These misconfigurations can lead to potential threats
to sensitive data [100]. For example, an attacker can alter the
destination address and transport sequence when the billing
and bidding messages are in transit. Consequently, such data
can leak the consumers’ privacy as data aggregated at the
data concentrators that utilized the backhaul network, as dis-
cussed in [121]–[123]. These unauthorised backhaul network
interceptions may lead to significant damage to infrastructure,
asset, financial loss, and harm to a household privacy.
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TABLE VII
SUMMARY OF PRIVACY/CONFIDENTIALITY THREATS IN SG METERING NETWORK
Privacy/confidentiality threats
Threat Description Security goals compromised Threat impact
Radio Eavesdropping
[119] [120]
SMI data can be leaked over the wireless radio through Authenticity, confidentiality, integrity
HighUnauthorized RF interception, Eavesdropping and MITM Confidentiality, Authenticity
Forwarding point
compromise [59] [99]
In SMI network, a rouge forwarding point can be utilized for Confidentiality Low to MediumSpoofing, Unauthorized forwarding, and Message modification Authenticity, Confidentiality integrity
Backhaul network
interception [121]–[123]
In the public backhaul network, an attacker may control Authenticity
HighSMI data and device: Unauthorized aggregation, Address Confidentiality, integrity, authenticity
spoofing, and Malconfiguration Authenticity, integrity
Misuse of data [124] [125] At the back end server, the misused of SMI data may cause Privacy violation Low to Medium
Data breach
D. Misuse of private data
For privacy threats, many researches have considered the
privacy issues that arise when the fine-grained consumption
information is sent/aggregated directly to/by the distribution
network operator (DNO)/energy suppliers, even though this
may be the legitimate mode of operation of the system
(i.e., no external attacker) [124], [125], [127]. Even if the
DNO/supplier is trustworthy, there is also the subsequent
threat of a data breach at the DNO, which could reveal this
private consumption information to other stakeholders (such
as consumer electronic companies). For instance, consumer
electronic companies may use utility databases where the
consumption information are stored. Having access to such
databases, the consumer electronic companies may start fol-
lowing individuals to promote their products, which may be
not the interest of the consumers.
VIII. COUNTERMEASURES TO SYSTEM LEVEL SECURITY
FOR SG METERING NETWORK
To protect the SG metering network from threats to system
level security (as shown in Section V), this section discusses
extensive state-of-the-art papers including their pros and cons.
We first discuss the mitigations for radio takeover, credential
compromise, and back office compromise. Second, we present
the countermeasures for network barge-in by the unknown, and
finally, the possible solutions for detecting and mitigating DoS
attacks are discussed.
Radio subversion or takeover mitigations: In general, an
attacker can gain access over wireless communication and
can modify, inject, replay old messages to the smart meters
or to the data concentrator. To provide a secure framework,
Caropreso et al. proposed an open source framework for
(customized) smart meters [128]. The framework is based on
a client-server architecture, where a smart meter acts as a
client and a gateway acts as a server. To mitigate the wireless
communication threats (e.g., radio eavesdropping), the authors
employed the traditional openSSL protocol that establishes
a TLS-based secure communication over the wireless chan-
nels between the client and the server. Further, the authors
evaluated the data traffic and performance evaluation, and
claimed that the proposed framework is semantically secured.
Nevertheless, the proposed framework lacks a threat model,
such that it is not easy to justify whether the framework is
secure against replay attack, message modification attack, etc.
In addition, the framework is limited to the customized smart
meters, which may not be always practical as the smart meters
are typically manufactured by the different manufacturers.
Similarly, Vaidya et al. proposed a secure scheme that
authenticates control command in the smart grid infrastructure
[96]. Based on ECC, the scheme utilized an interactive on-
the-fly verification and/or key agreement for the participating
entities over the wireless communication in a HAN. The
idea is as follows – the authors assumed that the involved
entities (e.g, home device, mobile, and gateway) first need to
pre-compute the cryptographic coupons and then prove their
legitimacy using the coupons. The authors utilized three-party
authentication (i.e., mobile, home device, and gateway), and
claimed that their scheme is secure against impersonation and
MITM attacks. In addition, an attacker cannot forge the control
command within the HAN.
The scheme may require high computational and commu-
nicational costs due to a large number of message exchanges
between the involved parties (user, smart meter, and gateway).
Credential compromise mitigations: As the SMI is one
of key components in SG environment, a data concentrator is
one gateway to the WANs that include the SG control center
[129]. However, due to the lack of adequate access control
mechanisms or policies, an attacker may control VPN, HMI,
and ICS, and may compromise the credentials [62].
In [129], Hasan et al. proposed a cloud-centric collabo-
rative security service architecture dedicated to AMI. The
architecture provides, security as a service, including network
security monitoring, encryption key management and security
assessment. The geographically distributed architecture com-
prises of the following entities. (i) A WAN consists of AMI
concentrators and a control center. (ii) An AMI concentrator
integrated with a traffic monitoring unit, upstreams the data
to the WAN. It forms a NAN with SMs to collect data from
consumers. (iii) SMs are located at the consumers sites, e.g.,
homes and buildings, and upstream consumption usage data to
the NAN. The authors introduced a concept of distributed data
centers to enable security services for the AMI concentrators.
These data centers (and/or security servers) are connected with
the backbone network in a client-server manner. A dedicated
VPN tunnel is assigned for each client/server pair and the
security servers are running over the clouds.
Though, the architecture proposed in [129] claimed security
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TABLE VIII
SYSTEM LEVEL MITIGATION APPROACHES FOR RADIO TAKEOVER, CREDENTIAL COMPROMISE, AND BACK OFFICE COMPROMISE IN SG METERING
NETWORK
Threat Applications Wireless/Wired
Involved
entities
Test-bed/
Simulation
Security
Goals
Descriptions Ref.
RT Datamanagement Wireless
SM,
NAN Simulation 3,4
Pros: open source framework, client-server architecture, uses
openSSL, evaluated traffic and performance analysis [128]
Cons: lack of threat model, and lack of proper security analysis.
RT Datamanagement
ZigBee/
WiFi
SM,
Mobile,
head-end
– 3,5
Pros: presented a zero-knowledge identification scheme, on-the-fly key
agreement, protection against impersonation and MITM attacks. [96]
Cons: required high computational communicational costs that may
cause availability issues
CC SMI,
substation
management
unspecified SM, HAN,
NAN, WAN
Simulation –
Pros: proposes a cloud-based architecture, mathematical simulations,
overall latency is minimized. [129]
Cons: lack of threat model and security analysis, lack of VPN security,
encryption key management is not implemented, may vulnerable to
several attacks
CC Substation
management
unspecified substation,
control
center
Simulation 3,4
Pros: proposes a data-centric access control framework, utilizes fully
homomorphic encryption, bloom filter, secure against MITM and
spoofing attacks.
[130]
Cons: if the broker is compromised then what will be the (negative)
impact, bloom filter is subjected to high false positive rate.
BOC Substationmanagement – — – –
Pros: suggested black and white listing connections, inbound/ out-
bound logging and monitoring, and end-to-end secure framework. [98]
Cons: the authors did not proposed any solution.
RT: radio takeover; CC : credential compromise; BOC: back office compromise; – : no proof of concepts/simulations;
Security goals – 1 : Availability; 2 : Integrity; 3 : Confidentiality; 4 : Authentication; 5 : Non-repudiation; 6: Authorization; 7 : Accountability;
services, there is an implicit assumption that an integrated
traffic management unit demands a predefined criteria to
discover potential anomalies. The criteria is never defined.
In addition, the proposed scheme is a mathematical model,
such that it may have several practical issues from the security
service perspectives. For instance, encryption key management
over VPNs is neither discussed nor implemented.
Based on publish/subscribe model, Duan et al. proposed
a new framework that enables a secure and adequate access
control in smart grid [130]. The proposed secure framework
can be applied to many scenarios in SG metering network, e.g.,
event analysis, human machine interface, remote control, alarm
control, etc. The authors utilized a fully homomorphic encryp-
tion and the publisher’s private key to publish data securely
and utilized the bloom-filter based encoded control policies to
mitigate the credential compromise threats. With the attribute-
based access control policies, the encrypted data can only
be accessed by subscribers who are granted privileges. The
framework includes three entities, subscriber, publisher, and
broker. The scheme invokes, when a subscriber generates
its query and sends it to the publisher. Upon receiving the
query, the publisher translates the query to attribute-based
access control policy and encrypts the query, and then sends
it to the broker for verification. The framework requires each
subscribing query must be authenticated via the broker before
it granted access to the system credentials. The framework has
been justified as a safeguard against two attacks, e.g., MITM
attack and spoofing attack.
Indeed, the framework may provide security against the
credential compromise attacks. Nevertheless, the framework
does not account the (negative) impact of the framework in
smart grid domain if the broker is compromised. The broker
always needs to be online otherwise the framework would not
be useful in practice. Moreover, a bloom filter is typically
subjected to high false positive rate that may cause encoded
policies to be forwarded unnecessarily.
Back office compromise mitigations: Recently, back of-
fice has been compromised using the potential malware, e.g.,
BlackEnergy, as shown in [55], [98]. Such attack could affect
the end-user data and normal back office operations in SG
metering networks, e.g., billing, credit rating, and so on [131].
In order to mitigate back office threats in SG, Khan et al.
[98] suggested protection strategies against the back office
compromise attacks with a particular focus on the BlackEn-
ergy malware, as follows. (i) Black and white listing connec-
tions: In this, the external Internet Protocol (IP) addresses can
be listed as a black-list (i.e., untrusted source) and white-list
(i.e., trusted source). Essentially, it is not possible to make the
black-list for those of unforeseen future updates of malware.
However, the white-list of trusted and reliable destination
can be managed, specially for the dedicated smart meters,
field devices, data concentrators, and control centers, etc. (ii)
Inbound/outbound logging and monitoring: As packets are
transmitted and received using bi-directional communication,
inbound/outbound packet monitoring and logging is possible
in SMI for each entity, e.g., smart meter, data concentrator,
field device, and control center. (iii) End-to-end security mech-
anisms: To prevent the SG metering systems from such mal-
ware, an end-to-end security mechanism may be an effective
solution without including the key distribution centers.
Summary: In Table VIII, we summarize all the proposed
countermeasures for the radio takeover [128] [96], credential
compromise [130] [97], and back office compromise [98] in
the terms of applications, communication mode (i.e., wire-
less/wired), involved entities, test-bed/simulation, security and
privacy goals, and descriptions with pros and cons.
Lessons Learned: We discuss the lessons learned while
reviewing the state of the art schemes. The aforementioned
proposals are the imperative efforts as they can deal with
the radio takeover, credential compromise and back office
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compromise threats. However, the cons can have tremendous
negative impacts on legitimate entities and this (negative)
impact should be further examined.
Radio takeover mitigations – In [128], the authors proposed
to establish a secured connection between a SM and NAN
gateway by employing the openSSL protocol. In 2018, Guido
Vranken reported a security issue in the key establishment
in the TLS handshake, which uses Diffie-Hellman’s based
ciphersuite. During the handshake process, an attacker can
make use of a malicious server to send a large prime number to
the client device over the public (i.e., wireless/wired) network,
as shown in [132]. This large prime may induce the client
to spend an immoderately long period of time establishing a
secret key for such large prime numbers. As a consequence,
this immoderately long period could be exploited in a DoS
attack at the client. Considering the cyber attacks on the
Ukrainian power distribution, such very large prime value
can be alarming, and/or be a potential target for an attacker
if he/she takes over on radio communications. Therefore,
a careful design of security scheme is still paramount. In
contrast, Vaidya et al.’s scheme [96] provides security to
control command but requires high communicational and
computational costs.
Credential compromise mitigations – Approaches such as
cloud-centric collaborative security service architecture did not
discuss how and what policies should be defined to detect
the anomalies and how to manage the keys for VPNs. In
[130], indeed the bloom filter based encoded control policies
can provide protection from credential compromise threats.
However, in real practice, a bloom filter is generally subjected
to (high) false positive rate that may lead encoded policies to
be forwarded unnecessarily to, e.g, human machine interface,
acquisition and estimation systems.
Back office compromise mitigations – Khan et al. suggested
many ways to mitigate back office compromise attacks for
real-time controlling and monitoring in SG [98]. Few of the
mitigation mechanisms are: black and white listing, and in-
bound/outbound monitoring. These solutions can be applied to
SG metering network, but it is hard to discuss the practicality
and lessons learned of the suggested countermeasures as they
are not implemented in the real world SG scenarios.
Network barge-in by unknown mitigations: In practice,
the entities in the smart grid will exchange data over wireless
mesh network in single-hop or multi-hop manner [110], [111].
Routing and message forwarding, therefore, are paramount
services for end-to-end communications in smart metering,
system monitoring and controlling, etc. As discussed in the
attack taxonomy (i.e., Network/routing barge-in by unknown),
an ill-intention adversary can mount several DoS attacks on the
routing path. For example, malicious routing information/node
can be injected/planted into the routing path of a network
(such as, a puppet attack). As a consequence, inconsistencies
in the SM network operations may occur. However, numerous
schemes have been presented to improve routing security in
smart grid [99], [133]–[141], as shown in Table IX.
There are proposals for wireless mesh networking in AMI
networks that targeted on NAN applications. For example,
Saputro-Akkaya proposed a secure piggybacking-based ad-
Agent m Agent n
DoS attack 
impacted region
Fig. 9. Data flocking – bypassing DoS region in multiphop routing [143].
dress resolution protocol (ARP) in [99]. The protocol utilized
for IEEE 802.11s-based AMI network. The work addressed
potential flooding issues in the ARP and proposed an efficient
mechanism to solve those issues. The authors specifically uti-
lized two types of packets: (i) proactive path request (PREQ)
packet, and (ii) path reply (PREP) packet in AMI network.
Mesh path is enabled via the path discovery protocol, which
is defined by a default and mandatory hybrid wireless mesh-
routing protocol (HWMP). The idea of this scheme is to
piggyback the ARP packets (i.e., PREQ and PREP) while the
route is being searched in the context of AMI. As the authors
mentioned during the process of piggybacking of the ARP
packets, it is very likely that a PREQ packet may be exposed
to the possible ARP cache poisoning attacks. To overcome this
attack, the authors computed a signature (i.e., elliptic curve
digital signature algorithm (ECDSA)) to each piggybacked
packet to authenticate the messages. However, the use of per-
piggybacked packet cryptographic signature induced overhead
to an intermediate router, when it is receiving several thou-
sands of PREQ request from the smart meters in the meter
local area network (MLAN).
A secure scalable routing and data aggregation (SRDA)
approach has been evaluated for wireless meter network by
Wan et al. [133]. To determine the best routing path, the au-
thors first introduced the inter-domain proxy and intra-domain
proxy concepts. The inter-domain proxy is a smart meter
that aggregates data between the different MLAN. Whereas,
the intra-domain proxy that collects meter data within the
MLAN. The identity-based cryptography (IBC) mechanism is
being used (for wireless smart meter) to issue and update the
routing information in a secure manner. The trusted public key
generator (PKG) is employed to generate system parameters
for the SRDA. The proxy re-encryption mechanism is designed
to preserve data privacy. Although the authors claimed that a
software-defined network based secure architecture has been
utilized for securing routing, there is a lack of details about
the proposed SRDA. For instance, it is not described how
IBC is being implied on the control and data planes of SDN
architecture in the SRDA [133]
In another work [134], Wei-Kundur described a resilient
multicast routing called “GOAliE” for smart grid applica-
tions. The approach utilized publish—subscribe paradigm and
flocking theory where a phasor measurement unit (PMU)
message-flock traverses from agent m to n in multihop manner
while bypassing DoS region, as shown in Fig. 9. To bypass
DoS impacted region, the authors employed agent-interaction
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TABLE IX
SYSTEM LEVEL MITIGATION APPROACHES FOR NETWORK BARGE-IN BY UNKNOWN IN SG METERING NETWORKS
Ref. Comm.mode
Involved
entities
Routing
metrics
Routing
mode
Sec. & Pri
Goals Descriptions
[99]
802.11s
wireless
mesh
SM,
gateway
PDR, E2ED,
throughput multi-path 2, 4
Pros: addressed issues of ARP flooding; proposed secure ARP scheme;
utilized piggybacking concepts; three-way handshake is required; and
added signature to each packet; and performed integrity and authentication
for PREQ and PREP; secure against spoofing attack and MITM attack.
Cons: overall high communication overhead for resource-hungry SM.
[133] Wireless
SM,
data
concentrator
scalability,
EE unspecified 3,4,5
Pros: a secure routing and data aggregation approach; presented the
identifier-based cryptography mechanism; SDN based secure architecture;
scalable and energy-efficient; and addressed confidentiality, mutual authen-
tication, non-repudiation and secure against MITM.
Cons: lack of security details on data and control planes in SDN.
[134] 802.16WiMax – PDR, LTC multi-hop 1
Pros: resilient multicast routing for smart grid applications; resilient
distributed multicast data delivery; and protection from DoS attack.
Cons: the approach is not practical if synchronous data needs to be
delivered within time [142].
[135] 802.15.4wireless
SM,
consumer,
distribution
LTC, REL,
overhead multi-path unspecified
Pros: suggested SPEED routing protocols; evaluated communication per-
formances, i.e., latency, reliability, and overhead.
Cons: security is out of scope for such critical smart grids.
[135] 802.15.4wireless
SM
consumer,
distribution
LTC, REL,
overhead multi-path unspecified
Pros: discussed MMSPEED routing protocols; communication latency,
reliability and overhead are evaluated.
Cons: security is out of scope for such critical smart grids.
[140] Wireless
SM,
data
concentrator,
utility
packet loss unspecified 4
Pros: investigated sinkhole attack; Enhanced RPL routing; node-to-node
authentication; detected key-compromising attacks; utilized data mining.
Cons: enhanced RPL does incur (high) packet budget; central database
always needs to be online; lack of security analysis.
[141] Wireless –
CA, CC ,
CI
single-path
multi-path 1
Pros: presented vulnerability assessment model; mitigating link insecuri-
ties, capitalized SDN framework.
Cons: more complex to configure in cases of negative edge.
PDR: packet delivery ratio; E2ED: end-to-end delay; LTC: latency; REL: reliability; EE: energy-efficiency; CA: cost-on-availability; CI : cost-on-integrity;
CC : cost-on-confidentiality; MITM : man-in-the-middle;
Security and Privacy goals – 1 : Availability; 2 : Integrity; 3 : Confidentiality; 4 : Authentication; 5 : Non-repudiation; 6: Authorization; 7 : Accountability;
8 : Anonymity; 9 : Unlinkability; 10 : Undetectability; 11 : Unobservability; 12 : Pseudonymity
based heuristic principles, as follows: flock centering, seeking
goal, velocity matching, obstacle evasion, collision avoidance
and behavioral transitions. In GOAliE, the authors considered
traditional routing performance measurements such as, end-
to-end latency budget, buffer overflow and packet deliver
ratio. Through simulation, the authors demonstrated how the
GOAliE utilizes the effective multicast routing algorithms to
promote resilience in faulted power systems in the presence
DoS attack on communication infrastructure. However, Ma-
soumiyan et al. pointed out that the GOAliE strategy does not
fit to synchronous data delivery, in [142].
A few proposals focus on low-cost wireless sensor network
(WSN) in smart grid networks. For instance, Sahin et al.
presented and evaluated quality of service distinguishing in
two routing protocols (i.e., single path routing and multi
path routing) in [135]. The authors assumed several numbers
of low-cost sensor nodes are deployed from generation to
consumer side. These nodes can enable various applications
in smart grid, e.g., metering, monitoring and controlling, and
dynamic pricing, energy management, and can communicate
via single or multi hop networks. Sahin et al. highlighted
performance evaluation for two routing protocols (SPEED and
MMSPEED) considering communication latency, reliability
and overhead. In addition, the authors pointed out that the
secure routing is highly required in a SG domain, but lack of
discussion on the possible solutions.
In SMI, the smart meters and control center communicate
through the sink nodes. Following the routing threats, an
attacker can take control over these sink nodes and use them
to send malicious commands, for instance to turn off the
power of the consumer premises. In [140], Taylor-Johnson
developed secure communications against sinkhole attacks in
smart grid metering networks. To set up a communication
link over the low-power mesh network, the scheme uses the
routing protocol for low-power and lossy networks (RPL)
protocol, which is a routing protocol for the low-power
and lossy networks. The RPL is based on distance vector
routing protocol. Nevertheless, to mitigate sinkhole attack,
the authors proposed modification in RPL addressing by
utilizing encrypted authentication at each node-to-node link.
In addition, the scheme also detected whether any key is
compromised by using data mining techniques. To achieve
encrypted authentication in RPL, the centralized key database,
utility company key setup, and a static map were used. Note
that the authors did not provide much details on the system
setup. Nevertheless, each smart meter first generates own keys
(i.e., public and privacy) on the system startup, and then inserts
the key to the map, where the sink node could access them
from the central database. The significant drawback is that the
central database always needs to be online and could be the
target of attacks. Moreover, lack of security analysis could be
a major concern for usability of the proposed protocol.
Hammad et al. [141] enhanced communication security
in smart grid by employing software defined network and
achieved satisfactory quality of service by mitigating insecure
communication links. The scheme takes advantage of three
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different encryptions, where link security is attributed mainly
built on security strength of the encryption algorithm. The
authors defined (traditional) security metrics based on CIA
(confidentiality, integrity and availability) threat model, as
follows: CA, CI and CC as the cost-on-availability, cost-on-
integrity and cost-on-confidentiality, respectively. Here, cost-
on means the weight that is scaling the individual attribute,
which depends on the impact of considered threat model.
However, selecting the optimal threshold value could be a
challenge for the weighted-value since the trust decision is
typically not defined in the scheme. Moreover, the scheme
did not discuss the case of negative edges in the network.
In another research [144], Mishra et al. discussed the packet-
based attacks and studied the optimal inspection points (OIP)
problem. In this paper, OIP finds many points for malicious
attack detection in the smart grid applications, especially
where each single packet or the network traffic is required to
be inspected deeply. To achieve this, the authors introduced
the concept of a set of OIPs that will perform the deep
packet inspection (DPI) on each routing packet before sending
the packet to the control center. However, such deep packet
inspections may reveal the privacy of the consumption uses.
More surveys on routing protocols in smart grid can be found
in [110], [111].
Summary: In SG metering networks, most of the schemes
discuss a verity of attacks, e.g., secure to packet flooding
attack [99], resilient to MITM attack [133], resilient to DoS
attack [134], and sinkhole and spoofing attacks [140]. These
proposed solutions mainly use two types of countermeasures,
such as, cryptographic-based (e.g., [99], [133], [140], [141])
and networking-based (e.g., [134], [144]).
Lessons Learned: A smart meter data travels through mul-
tihop communications in the SM domain. Therefore, a route
maintenance is important in SG metering network to enable
the self-healing of faults. A routing protocol should be inte-
grated with a security and privacy design in order to mitigate
the public SG metering communication paths. Note that the
cryptography based techniques ( [99], [133], [140], [141]) can
protect from impersonation, masquerade, MITM, and integrity
attacks. However, these techniques does not appear effective to
detect other malicious attacks or malfunction due to the packet
modification. Therefore, one of lesson is that a malfunction
leads to many other attacks, e.g., sinkhole, packet forwarding,
warmhole, etc. Second, the aforementioned proposed schemes
come at the high cost of signature verification (for each
packet). Moreover, following the schemes proposed in [142],
[134] can lead to data synchronous problems in the smart grid
domain. Therefore, both the schemes may not be practical
for the energy feedback purposes in the load management
applications.
Third, considering a packet-based detection approach, as
proposed in [144], where each packet has to be scanned
to detect the existence of potential attacks, if any, in the
SG network. Scrutinizing each packet increases the time-
consuming, thereby induced significant delays in throughputs.
Moreover, such packet-based deep scanning on fine-grain
energy consumption data may rise privacy issues. Thus, there
is a critical need to rethink to design secure routing protocols
with high performance evaluations from the real-time SG
metering network viewpoint.
Finally, the privacy risks can also be emanated due to
the data routing, which is typically done in a “store-carry-
and-forward” mode. Nevertheless, majority of the proposed
schemes have been neither designed nor implemented with a
focus of privacy-aware routing in SMI that can mitigate the
privacy risk in “store-carry-and-forward ” mode. Such privacy
violation can give the attacker unauthorized access to smart
meter’s requests, if the adversary is topologically close to a
SM. We therefore believe that any communication (whether
single-hop or multi-hop) paradigm used – a SG metering
network must be supported with the possible aspects of privacy
goals as pointed out in the Section IV.C (cf., privacy goals).
Denial of Service attack mitigations: As shown in Fig. 7,
the denial of service (DoS) threats aim for malicious activities
that weaken the operational performance from its anticipated
operations, at various level of the network. In smart grid net-
work, DoS threat could be even more disruptive as industrial
control and automation systems are main driving forces for
the grid automation. For instance, field devices (e.g., sensors,
meters, phasor measurement units) are main components in the
smart grid networks. To form a network, these devices usually
utilized wireless mesh technology for exchanging information
between the entities. However, a wireless mesh network is
prone to routing-based DoS attacks as demonstrated in [59].
To mitigate DoS attack, Lee et al. [145] described and
simulated a new mechanism to detect and monitor the mis-
behaviour of neighbouring mesh devices in a smart meter
mesh network. The main idea of the scheme is to introduce
a head node, which is similar to the data concentrator at the
neighbourhood area network (NAN). The scheme suggested
that a new device (smart meter (IEEE 802.11)) who intends
to join the network, should be registered with the data con-
centrator. Upon registration, the identity of new node identity
and location (i.e., X and Y coordinates) are verified and then a
fresh session key is established among the head node and new
node. Here, the head node is the local coordinator that contains
the location information (in node information table) of the
wireless mesh nodes (e.g., end-user smart meters). However,
to monitor the misbehavior: (i) each node (e.g., A) not only
continuously monitor its (two-hop) neighbouring nodes, but
it counts incoming/outgoing packets from/to the monitoring
nodes. (ii) Based on the pre-defined threshold value, the node
A assures whether the incoming/outgoing messages are within
the pre-defined value or not. If the determined value exceeds
than the threshold value, then the node is compromised. To
check the performance of the proposed scheme, a dynamic
source routing (DSR) protocol is used and simulation results
demonstrated that the routing misbehavior detection can be
achieved by 97%.
However, the DSR protocol has inherent limitation that the
packet size grows with route length to the source routing.
The other major challenge is determining the threshold value.
To deal with this, the authors proposed to employ automatic
threshold revision process, which is based on the pre-defined
time. This scheme may have some vulnerabilities. For in-
stance, it assumed that if an attacker exploits the pre-defined
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time based threshold value, then he/she can execute the attacks
on automatic threshold revision process, which may increase
significant packet loss rate.
Hu-Gharavi [146] suggested and simulated a new se-
curity (i.e., random key distribution) approach in wireless
mesh network. To verify the mesh node (i.e., smart meter)
authenticity, the authors utilized built-in (i.e., IEEE 802.11s)
authentication protocol called “simultaneous authentication
of equals (SAE)”. Here, the authentication procedure is in-
fluenced by a single pre-shared key (and/or master key),
which is known among other mesh nodes. However, a single
discloser of key can easily violate security of the network,
and can allow an unauthorized node to enter into the network
(recall credential compromised in Section V.B). Therefore,
the authors suggested a new countermeasure called “efficient
mesh security association (EMSA)”. The EMSA uses a key
hierarchy to achieve as similar secure authentication as in the
SAE. Note that since both the protocols (SAE and EMSA)
are based on 4-way handshaking, DoS attacks can jeopardize
the network. To mitigate DoS attacks, the authors proposed
dynamic key distribution and key refreshment strategy. With
the proposed strategy, the keys (including master session key)
can be updated regularly (e.g., a week, a month or six months)
before the master key expiration. The main shortcoming of
the Hu-Gharavi’s scheme is that a compromised node still can
participate to the network until the master is valid for that
particular duration. Moreover, Toor-Ma [147] pointed out that
the scheme proposed in [146] is still vulnerable to the replay
attack in EMSA.
Wireless communication networks for the smart metering
network are potentially exposed to jamming threats. Several
literature pointed out that jamming attacks pose constant DoS
threat to smart grid applications [148], [102].
To mitigate jamming issues in smart gird applications (i.e.,
home metering and substation automation), Lu et al. [148]
investigated two different types of jamming-resilient commu-
nication modes: (i) Coordinated link – two entities (i.e., a
sender node and a receiver node) should possess a pre-shared
unique secret key (e.g., code-frequency channel assignment)
and this key should not be revealed to adversary. Note that, a
sender is an intelligent electronic device (IED) that communi-
cates with the gateway (i.e., receiver node) over the wireless
communication. (ii) Uncoordinated link – in this link, the
transmitter and receiver must select a frequency-code channel
randomly to send/receive a packet. The message can only be
received if both the sender and receiver have same channel,
otherwise the message will be invalid. In addition, the authors
evaluated the worst-case performance for jamming process
and proposed a new system called “transmitting adaptive cam-
ouflage traffic (TACT)” system. The TACT consists of three
types of traffics: (i) routine traffic for power monitoring and
controlling purpose, (ii) probing traffic for measuring network
performance, and (iii) camouglage traffic to balance the traffic
load from the sender node to receiver node. Moreover, the
authors suggested the implementation of the proposed TACT
to every node, since it measures the delivery results of probing
packets to adapt the number of camouflage packets in the
network. Each camouflage packet is sent over a randomly
chosen frequency/code channel. The system hence attains a
trade-off between the message delay and the message delivery
ratio. The main drawback of the TACT is the efficiency relies
on homogeneous traffic rate of the all nodes, which however,
may not be assured if there exists heterogeneous traffic rates.
In another research, Premarathne et al. [151] designed a
secure and reliable cognitive radio (CR) sensor network in
SG. The authors proposed to use a CR sensor, which is
installed within a smart meter and it communicates over CR
network to transmit the HAN data (i.e., consumption usages)
to the field or neighbourhood area network. This research
utilized a machine learning-based physical unclonable function
(PUF) that generates secret keys and add noise to the keys.
However, the noise needs correct error detection techniques
that demand high computational resources, which are stringent
in CR sensors. More research on CR in the SG can be found
in [104], [109].
To achieve transport layer security, another so-called (java-
based) open source framework (jOSEF) proposed in [149]
with proof-of-simulation. The jOSEF provides an end-to-end
secure link between the smart meter and the external market
participant (EMP) in smart grid. This work mainly utilized
the transport layer protocol based security mechanism that re-
quired user authentication of the clients against the smart meter
gateway (SMGW). In the proposed framework, the SMGW
is provided with cryptographic functions, e.g., public-private
key generation module and digital certificates, and performed
end-to-end transport layer security (TLS) between the SMGW
and EMP. However, the jOSEF framework has the following
drawbacks: (i) it does not support remote administration; (ii)
it does not provide protection to the meter data that can
raise privacy issues; and (iii) the jOSEF is implemented with
only few security properties, such as password-based user
authentication. Moreover, the paper does not provide how the
security features have been covered and/or implemented.
In the same vein, Khaled et al. [150], addressed a study
about secure (TCP/IP, i.e., transmission control protocol and
internet protocol) communication in the power substation that
supports smart metering communications. The authors have
studied a substation automation that can remotely monitor
and control the power distribution components via the smart
meters. The authors specified a framework, namely, manufac-
turing messaging specification protocol (MMSP). The MMSP
is utilized to communicate real-world data, and to control
information between several devices in the SG. The MMSP
traffic mainly secured at the application and transport layers
via utilizing the X.509 certificates. Moreover, the authors
analysed several cipher suite combinations, including key
exchange, encryption and hashing, and their memory overhead,
within the intra-network scenario. The security goals include
data confidentiality, integrity violation detection, and packet-
level validation for the SCADA system. Considering [107],
TCP with TLS is vulnerable to attack, where an attacker
can intercept the sequence counter (SC) because the SC in
TCP evenly increment with each fixed data transfer. This
vulnerability gives enough room to an attacker to inject the
false data to a substation network.
Summary: In the SG metering networks, generally DoS at-
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TABLE X
ROBUSTNESS TO DENIAL-OF-SERVICES IN SMART GRID METERING NETWORKS
Ref.
Comm.
wireless/
wire-line
Involve
entities
Testbed/
Simulation Descriptions
[145]
802.11s
wireless
mesh
SM, NAN Simulation
Pros: protection from DoS attack based on routing misbehavior; proposed
neighbour nodes monitoring method; and used dynamic source routing
between SM and data concentrator.
Cons: packet size grows with route length due to the source routing.
[146]
802.11s
wireless
mesh
SM, NAN Simulation
Pros: identified SAE and EMSA DoS vulnerabilities; proposed a periodic
key refreshment and distribution strategy for DoS attack; and employed
tree-based routing.
Cons: the proposed strategy still leads to the replay attack in EMSA, i.e.,
further leading to the DoS attacks, as shown in [147].
[148] 802.11s/wireless – Simulation
Pros: proposed a transmitting adaptive camouflage traffic (TACT) system;
mitigating jamming and DoS attacks
Cons: efficiency relies on homogeneous traffic rate, which is not always
practical.
[149] unspecified SM, NAN Testbed
Pros: a java based open source smart meter gateway experimental frame-
work; provide end-to-end link; transport layer based security mechanism;
and password-based authentication
Cons: implements only a limited subset security functionalities, lack of
security analysis.
[150] wireless SM, NAN Simulation
Pros: a secure communication in the substation; IEC 61850 specifications;
security is provided by TLS; and provide confidentiality, tamper detection,
and message-level authentication.
SAE: simultaneous authentication of equals; EMSA: efficient mesh security associatation; – : unspecified
tacks target the availability of system. Such attacks can disrupt
the network or cause delay in packet delivery, jamming/block
messages (e.g., high priority control commands), or sometimes
misdirect the whole system from top to down and vice versa.
Table X summarizes how existing approaches can detect and
mitigate DoS attacks.
Lessons Learned: The lessons learned from DoS coun-
termeasures is that DoS threats should be addressed at the
intrinsic level, as follows. (i) Schemes, such as [145], detects
the misbehaviour of the neighbouring nodes where each node
is regarded as a watchdog for the two-hop nodes. This watch-
dog node counts incoming and outgoing packets from the
neighbouring nodes, which therefore multiplexes data in the
network. Consequently, each watchdog may have storage is-
sues. Moreover, the authors utilized the pre-defined time-based
threshold value, which may have different timing classes,
e.g., millisecond, seconds, minutes, and so on. Therefore, we
believe that to select a particular time class is challenging,
since it is usually based on the SG metering applications, as
shown in Table IV.
(ii) In order to mitigate the jamming based DoS attack, Lu
et al proposed the TACT that measures the delivery of probing
packets to adjust the camouflage packets in the network [148].
The TACT also has issues of heterogeneous traffic rates that
cannot be considered as the robust solution. This is still an
idea to solve the jamming issues. There is a need to do more
in-depth analysis considering the heterogeneous traffic rates in
real SG metering networks.
(iii) Other approaches include TLS based solutions to mit-
igate the DoS attacks. For instance, in [149], the jOSEF is
proposed as an end-to-end TLS security suite between the
smart meter gateway and the external market participant, with
proof-of-simulations. Similarly, a TLS-based approach has
been studied for the IEC 61850 based substation in [150].
However, Wang et al. demonstrated that if an adversary can
inject false data to the plain TCP stream then it can lead to
DoS attack on a TLS stream [107]. In addition, a vulnerability
reported in TLS-based handshake also leads to DoS attack, as
shown in [132]. As the SG metering networks are complex
engineering marvels, and are distributed in nature, there is
an immense need to investigate the potential impacts and
countermeasures of DoS attacks in each part of the networks.
IX. THEFT OF SERVICES COUNTERMEASURES IN SG
METERING NETWORK
Mitigation to smart meter cloning: Recall the threat tax-
onomy – by cloning a smart meter, an attacker can change the
original meter or radio channel identity (ID) with the duplicate
copy in order to make the frauds on the services provided by
the smart grid.
To mitigate such smart meter cloning, Mustapa et al. [152]
proposed a hardware based authentication that utilized the
challenge-response mechanism. The research suggested that
a smart meter is integrated with the unique ring oscillator
physically unclonable function (ROPUF) on the integrated
circuit (IC), which is known as immutable. More precisely, the
small randomness can take place at ICs manufacturing process,
and therefore PUF can use the small randomness to produce
a number of binary IDs. These IDs are typically unique for
every Silicon chip, and cannot be easily modeled.
Each ROPUF needs to be registered at the utility company
(UC) before the deployment. During the registration, for each
smart meter, the UC records all the hamming code parity bits
pairs along with its challenges from each ROPUF IC. Here
the hamming code parity bits pairs are utilized to generate the
authentication keys and to verify the ROPUF responses at the
UC. The scheme can provide different levels of authentication,
i.e., L1 - L5, utilizing various lengths of parity bits, i.e., 64,
128, 256, 512, 1024 bits, respectively. To set up a secure
communication, the UC sends a challenge request to the SM,
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which then replies with a positive response to the UC. If the
response is negative then the smart meter will be given two
more chances to produce a positive response. If the smart
meter still fails, the UC broadcasts a BLOCK message to all
the devices in the entire network to block communication from
that particular smart meter. The scheme achieves confidential-
ity and authentication, and secure against the impersonation
attack. Moreover, the authors have simulated their scheme,
i.e., (i) the authentication time, and (ii) the storage required for
(hamming code parity bits pairs and challenge) for 50 years of
lifespan. In addition, a machine leaning based algorithm (e.g.,
support vector machine) can detect if there exists any meter
that is modeled by an attacker.
However, the scheme may have storage issues – if there are
millions of smart meters in a city/town then the UC needs
huge storage (especially for L3 - L5).
To avoid illegal cloning and tampering, Zhou proposed
another interesting research, i.e., secure SM sealing based on
radio frequency (RF) tag in [113]. In the scheme, each SM is
assumed to be sealed with the RFID tag to prevent illegal
frauds in the meter (e.g., manipulating readings). To deter
possible adversaries, the author designed a new authentication
protocol where a SM seal/tag sends random number (SRN )
to the reader. Upon receiving the random number, the reader
generates an encrypted token (ET ), which includes a secure
key (SKey), and sends ET and SRN to the SM tag. The SM
now verifies SRN , and decrypts ET in order to obtain the
key (SKey). The scheme also provides message integrity and
confidentiality to the wireless messages.
Indeed, such SM sealing can protect the cloning. However,
the author did not provide the security and performance
analysis on the smart meter sealing. Moreover, the RF sealing
may be an expensive solution, and may require back-end
database management, which is not discussed in the paper.
Mitigation to smart meter compromise: An attacker can
compromise the smart meter to make energy theft. More
precisely, the energy companies are approximately losing
millions of dollars annually due to energy theft [114].
Based on the mathematical analysis, Han-Xiao proposed
a non-technical loss fraud detection (NFD) [114]. The NFD
utilized Lagrange polynomial interpolation model to detect
the behaviour of multiple compromised meters and multiple
adversaries. The NFD needs an additional meter (called ob-
server meter) to be deployed to record the energy supplied
and reported to/by the smart meters (e.g., n meters) during
time Ti. The mathematical model can work when all the smart
meters have the same accuracy and/or consumption behaviour,
which is not always practical. For instance, in a real-time
scenario where each meter may have different accuracy at
different timings. Moreover, the scheme proposed in [114]
requires additional observer meters, which may add significant
deployment and maintenance costs to the utility companies.
Similarly, Yip et al. proposed another mathematical model
to detect defective smart meters and energy theft in [153].
However, this scheme can detect the tampered smart meters
but cannot conceal end-user’s privacy.
Based on the cryptographic approach, Ho et al. [154]
proposed two security schemes against the smart meter com-
promise attack in smart grid. In their mitigations, the authors
proposed to use of signcryption algorithm that achieves weak
confidentiality and strong confidentiality in the protocol I and
protocol II, respectively. With the help of trusted authority,
all the entities (smart meter, data collector unit (DCU), and
server) compute their public and private keys, and signing
and verification keys. Then each smart meter is registered
(securely) with the server. In protocol I, for each data trans-
mission, a smart meter computes hashing and a signcryption
message on the meter data, and then sends it to the server via
the DCU. Upon receiving the message, the server validates
the message by comparing its hashing and verifying the
correctness of signcryption. If the server receives numbers
of messages then it delegates messages to the DCU. After
receiving messages, the DCU verifies the messages, indicates
the invalid signature and reports the invalid signatures (if any)
to the server. Note that the invalid signatures belong to the
compromised smart meters. Finally, the server discards the
meter data corresponding to all invalid signatures. In protocol
II, the authors mainly focused on the demand response use-
case and provided an additional confidentiality service by
means of Pallier encryption.
Ho et al. provided a detailed security analysis on the mes-
sage authentication, confidentiality, and robustness to smart
meter compromise attack. However, the scheme did not sup-
port data aggregation in protocol I and protocol II, as pointed
out in [155]. Moreover, the protocol II may incurred significant
communication overhead.
Mitigation to location migration: As shown in the threat
taxonomy, an attacker may change the smart meter location
with a potential to fake measured energy consumptions to
lower the bills [157].
Parvez et al. [156] proposed a location-aware key manage-
ment system in the AMI. The authors introduced an interesting
idea, i.e., a location aware encryption scheme where a smart
meter utilized a secret key that is associated with its own
location coordinates, as shown in Fig. 10. Notably, a TTP
manages a codebook that has a pool of encryption keys
(with indexes) and each key is associated with the location
points (X,Y) of the geo-location. For each data transmission,
the smart meter first randomly picks a key index, encrypts
it with the node ID and then sends the encrypted text to
the TTP. Upon receiving the message, the TTP verifies the
node and then sends the randomly chosen key index to the
control center to decrypt the data. If an attacker or consumer
changes the location of a smart meter then the data cannot be
encrypted/decrypted.
The scheme can mitigate the location migration problems,
but each meter needs to maintain a table to record the locations
of its neighbouring smart meters, which may raise privacy
issues. Moreover, it required the TTP always to be online,
which may not be practical, e.g., due to lack of the Internet
connectivity in remote areas.
In another research, Viswanatham et al. [115] proposed
a region-based group key management (KM) scheme where
the smart meter location migration is handled in a secure
way. The KM scheme is a self-enforceable scheme, since
the keys can be computed from the hierarchical levels. The
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TABLE XI
THEFT OF SERVICE MITIGATION APPROACHES IN SMART GRID METERING NETWORKS
Threat Applications Wireless/Wired
Involved
entities
Test-bed/
Simulation
Sec. & Pri.
Goals Descriptions Ref.
SMC Datamanagement Wireless
Utility,
SM Simulation 2,3,4,5
Pros: hardware based authentication; L1 - L5 authentication levels;
provides message confidentiality, integrity, and authentication between
smart meter and utility company; safeguard to cloning, impersonating
and spoofing attacks; SVM detects whether unauthorized meter exists.
[152]
Cons: the scheme may have storage issues.
SMC Datamanagement RFID
SM-tag,
reader – 3,4,5
Pros: RFID based smart meter sealing; provides integrity and con-
fidentiality protection capabilities, avoids unauthorized read, write,
tampering and recognition.
[113]
Cons: lack of security and performance analysis, RF sealing may be
an expensive solution.
MC Data
management
unspecified Utility,
SM
Simulation –
Pros: proposed a mathematical model to detect the energy frauds, The
scheme required an additional observer meter; Observer meter detects
the frauds.
[114]
Cons: additional cost for the observer meter, the scheme cannot
preserve the privacy.
MC Data & loadmanagement Wireless
meter,
data
collector,
head-end
Simulation 2,3,4
Pros: two schemes against smart meter compromise; Signcryption
achieves weak confidentiality in protocol I; In protocol II mainly
focused on demand-response program, provides strong confidentiality.
[154]
Cons: did not support data aggregation in protocol I and protocol II,
as pointed out in [155], protocol II incurs communication overhead.
SLM Datamanagement
Wireless
mesh
network
Meter,
utility Simulation 3
Pros: location-aware key management system; TTP manages a code-
book; provides message confidentiality. [156]
Cons: TTP always to be online; privacy issues.
SLM Datamanagement Wireless
Meter, DSS,
TU, MPS Simulation 3,4
Pros: proposed a region-based group key management; self-
enforceable scheme; . [115]
Cons: lack of security analysis; renewing key may be very expensive.
SMC: smart meter cloning; MC : Meter compromise; SLM: smart meter location migration; DSS: distribution sub-station; TU : transmission unit; MPS :
main power supply; – : no proof of concepts/simulations;
Security and Privacy goals – 1 : Availability; 2 : Integrity; 3 : Confidentiality; 4 : Authentication; 5 : Non-repudiation; 6: Authorization; 7 :
Accountability; 8 : Anonymity; 9 : Unlinkability; 10 : Undetectability; 11 : Unobservability; 12 : Pseudonymity
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Fig. 10. Location of the smart meters (SMs) [156].
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Fig. 11. Hierarchical network of smart grid [115].
authors assumed that a smart grid network can be divided
into hierarchical network, e.g., main power supply (MPS),
transmission unit (TU), distribution sub-station (DSS) and
smart meter (SM). The MPS is main head-end level, the TU
and DSS are intermediate levels, and the SM is end-node,
as shown in Fig. 11. In a hierarchical network, the keys are
distributed by the key distribution server (KDS), as follows. At
level one – a group key (GK) is shared among all the entities
under the MPS. At level two – another group key (KTUi) is
shared between all the lower entities of the TU. In addition,
the KDS also distributes an unique key (KS) to each smart
meter. Now, each DSS and smart meter computes their shared
key (KKR), as KKR = f(KS , ID). Here, ID is an identity
of the smart meter, and f is predefined random function,
i.e., embedded in all entities. The authors then generated
the DSS group key (GDSS), as (GDSS) = H(KKR||T ).
Here T is the current time of the DSS, and H is a hash
function. Likewise, the TU group key (GTU ) is generated,
as follows: GTU = H(GDSS ||r), where r is a random
number. Finally, the MPS group key (GMPS) is derived as
(GMPS) = H(GTU ||r).
In order to manage the smart meter location migration,
the key renewing costs is expensive. For instance, assumed
that a smart meter (M) wants to move from TU #1 to
TU #2, then the group-keys need to be renewed at every
level, i.e., DSS, TU and MSP levels. Therefore, the group
key management becomes challenging, if the meters change
locations frequently.
Summary: Table XI summarizes the mitigations to smart
meter cloning [152], [113]; meter compromise [114], [154];
and meter location migration [156], [115], including their
communication mode, involved entities, test-bed/simulation,
security and privacy goals, and description with pros and cons.
Each scheme is proposed to be a safeguard to theft of services
in smart grid.
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Lessons Learned: In SG metering network, smart meters
feed data to a plethora of applications which provide different
services, e.g., billing, monitoring, outage management, etc.
These meters can be used as source of theft that presents a
tough challenge for energy companies due to the fact that SMs
can be cloned, compromised, and their location can be mi-
grated. However, the disadvantage of the aforementioned pro-
posed approaches can be significant on the involved entities.
Hence, there is a need for further investigations to improve the
security of such threats to services. For instance, mitigation to
smart meter cloning: (i) In [152], as the authors suggested a
hardware authentication mechanism in AMI. Nevertheless, one
of the lessons is to design a tamper resistant IC that is resilient
from all types of potential attacks (such as side channel attack)
is challenging. Moreover, as the detection of modelled meter
is based on the support vector machine (SVM), it requires
a large volume of training data. Therefore, such detection
scheme is leveraged without the real-time constraints, e.g.,
the cost of quality of training data. In [113], the RFID based
smart meter sealing system requires back-end database to
manage the tag, keys, etc. If this part is compromised then
it may leak out SM tags data, encryption keys and other
paramount information, such as IDs. Therefore, it is essential
to strengthen the robust security of the back-end servers. In
addition, the utility companies have to pay extra cost to install
the sealing on the SM system. Therefore, who will bear such
sealing costs can become the concern in the energy market.
Mitigation to smart meter compromise: The schemes [114]
and [153] are based on the mathematical models that can detect
the default meters and energy theft. These schemes are either
depending on analysis of customer behaviour that needs a vast
quantity of historical data or requiring many extra devices that
are costly, e.g., observer meter. Since the proposed solutions
are mathematical concepts, it is not clear which scheme can
provide the best practical solution against such energy theft
and/or compromised/default smart meters. Therefore, there is
a critical requirement to make decision on the best solutions
with their negative impact’s analysis.
Mitigation to smart meter location migration: The proposed
schemes for smart meter location migration are a necessary
attempts to address location migration threats. As Parvez et
al [156] proposed a location-aware key management system,
it needs to manage a database that records the location of
the neighbouring smart meters. Such database still raises
the location privacy issues for neighbouring smart metes.
Similarly, another research (i.e., [115]) proposed region-based
group key management for smart meter migration/moving.
However, renewing keys for (frequent) entering and leaving
of smart meters cannot be practical for the entities, i.e., DSS,
TU and MPS.
X. PRIVACY/CONFIDENTIALITY THREATS
COUNTERMEASURES IN SG METERING NETWORK
Mitigation to eavesdropping/interception: Recall the
threat taxonomy, an (unauthorized) eavesdropping on the
wireless communication channels allows an attacker to
drop, alter, replay the consumption usages to the utility
companies. In addition, an attacker can draw the daily routine
of an individual via interception and can lead the privacy
threats. To mitigate such threats, several novel encryption and
authentication approaches have been proposed, as follows.
Encryption schemes: It aims to achieve confidential-
ity/privacy and protect sensitive data among the smart grid
components. Cryptographic algorithms make use of either
symmetric and/or asymmetric or homomorphic or altogether
to generate the ciphertext. Table XII summarises how en-
cryption schemes are applied in various smart grid metering
applications, involving entities, implementation mode, security
and privacy goals, and descriptions (i.e., pros and cons).
We reviewed the current state-of-the-art encryption schemes,
especially considering symmetric encryption [158], [159];
asymmetric encryption [120], [160]–[162]; and homomorphic
encryption [163]–[166].
Symmetric cryptosystem (SC): In the SC, two entities or
more utilized a shared secret key to enable a secure channel.
Usually symmetric encryption requires approximately con-
stant computational prices regardless of key sizes. A detailed
benchmark on symmetric encryption schemes for the resource-
hungry devices can be seen in [167]–[170].
To secure smart grid communication, Saxena-Grijalva [158]
proposed a dynamic secrets and secret keys based scheme. The
scheme mainly includes two entities, i.e., supervisory node
(SN) and control node (CN). A supervisory node corresponds
to a control center or a data aggregator node that collects
consumption unit of the homes via the smart meters. The
proposed scheme leverages on a pre-shared long-term string
(str), which is shared between each CN and SN. Whenever
the CN wants to communicate to the SN, it generates a
secure packet using str before the packet dissemination. In
addition, it counts the successful delivery of every single
packet transmitted over the wireless communication. Upon
receiving the packet from the CN, the SN verifies and checks
packet integrity, and then sends an acknowledgement (ack) to
the CN. Once ack received successfully at the CN, both the
nodes (i.e., CN and SN) can generate their dynamic secrets to
establish secure communication.
The dynamic secret scheme reduces the cost of cryptog-
raphy as only the hasing and XORing are required between
the CN and SN. However, the scheme has not given enough
attention to the SN. If it is compromised in a coherent way,
many attacks can be mounted easily.
Liu et al. [159] suggested a secure mechanism called “dy-
namic secret-based encryption” (DSE) for securing the smart
grid networks. DSE was proposed to establish a secure com-
munication connection among the smart devices (i.e., SMs)
and the control center (CC). The SM/sender and CC/receiver
agreed on two hash functions to compress a threshold value
of the one time frames (OTF) for the data link layer into
the dynamic secret (DS(k)). The agreed key (i.e., DS(k))
is utilized for data encryption and decryption at the source
and destination node, respectively. Moreover, the authors used
XORing for encryption and decryption operations to reduce
the computational cost, and claimed that their scheme can pro-
tect against information leaking and forging attacks. However,
the link layer has inherent security issues, including distance,
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interference, environmental factors, collisions, exhaustion, and
unfairness that can lead to critical DoS threats, as shown in
the request for comments (RFC) 6272 [171].
Asymmetric cryptosystem: Asymmetric cryptography applies
two different keys, i.e., private key and public key. The public
key utilized for encryption and can be published publicly. One
of the earlier standards is the Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
(RSA) encryption, typically using key of 1024 bits or greater.
Another approach is ECC, utilizing algebraic geometry-based
elliptic curves. ECC uses smaller key (160-bits) for the same
level of security as of the RSA (1024 bits). Nevertheless,
asymmetric cryptography requires more computational cost
than the symmetric cryptosystem [24]. A comprehensive com-
parisons between asymmetric and symmetric schemes can be
checked in [24], [175], [176].
Blending a number of asymmetric cryptographic techniques
(e.g., identity-committable signature, zero-knowledge proof,
and partially blind signature), Gong et al. [120] proposed
a privacy-preserving incentive-based DR program. In the
scheme, a smart meter receives identity-committable signature
(ICS) and registration token from the demand-response pro-
gram (DRP), at registration time. In addition, the smart meter
also receives a pseudonym, which provides identity privacy to
the smart meter and customer. In order to send consumptions
report at time (t), a smart meter collects consumption data,
computes an ICS signature and attaches the pseudonym to
the message. Then it sends entire message to the DRP. Upon
receiving the message, the DRP verifies its validity. If the
condition is true then it stores the consumption data, otherwise
discards the report. The individual metering data is signed in
such a way that data can be authenticated without disclosing
the personal identity of the signer. Nevertheless, it requires
high computational cost in registration and settlement phase
due to exponentiation operations.
Based on public key cryptography (i.e., RSA), a different
privacy-enhanced data aggregation scheme against the internal
attacker is investigated by Fan et al. [160]. The idea is straight
forward – an user (Ui) receives smart meter reading (i.e.,
Mi), encrypts the report, and finally sends the encrypted
report to the aggregator node. To accomplish the task, the
scheme includes an aggregator node (e.g., substation) and
users (e.g., end-user). In addition, the scheme also utilizes an
offline TTP in the network model. In the registration phase,
the aggregator node and end-users initially compute their
own key pair (including public and private keys) and other
cryptographic param and publishes them. The TTP selects
(n + 1) blinding factors {pi0 + pi1 + ...pin} randomly such
that pi0 + pi1 + ...pin ≡ 0 (mod N) and sends securely
these blinding factors pi0 to aggregator node, and pii to Ui
(user). These blinding factors are being used in aggregation
phase: the user collects power usage from the smart meter and
transforms it into a ciphertext, computes a signature and sends
the report to the data aggregator. The data aggregator verifies
the signature and the report in the batches. Fan et al. claimed
that the scheme proposed in [160] is secure from external
and internal attacks and achieved data integrity. However, the
scheme incurs significantly high communication overheads as
many thousand of consumers have to send the consumption
report every time (e.g., 15 min. or lesser) throughout a day. As
a consequent, the high overhead may not be a practical solution
in the real-world applications, and may induce a substantial
load on the data aggregator node.
For the financial auditing purpose, a range-based query
scheme called PaRQ is proposed for smart grid applications
in [161]. In this scheme, a residential user first performs
asymmetric encryption on his/her consumption usage and
then forwards the cipher text (i.e., consumption data) to the
cloud server. Later, whenever financial audits are required,
an authorized legal entity (e.g. audit requester) usually sends
query (including secure tokens) to the cloud repository where
the data is stored, and retrieves consumption usage of the
residential user. Specifically, the authors utilized a hidden
vector encryption (HVE) scheme and constructed a query for
encrypting the required attribute and session key. In PaRQ, the
authors used symmetric encryption (i.e., AES) for encrypting
the query, and achieved data confidentiality and query privacy.
Nevertheless, one main demerit in the HVE is that the size
of encrypted text and decryption key size are larger than the
length of the chosen vector. Another demerit in the HVE
scheme is that it may have issues with the one-to-many
encryptions scenarios.
Utilizing the PKI, Seo et al. described an automated demand
response mechanism that concentrates on the residential model
in [162]. The model utilized the standard OpenADR 2.0
protocol for advanced metering infrastructure. All devices
ensured security service using public key infrastructure (PKI)
certificates and digital certificates issued by a trusted certificate
authority. To offer a secure Internet connection, information
exchanges are accomplished with transport layer security
(TLS) version 1.0 encryption. Similar to other schemes, this
scheme also requires high computational cost in registration
and settlement phase due to the exponentiation operations.
In [177], Ni et al. proposed EIGamal encryption based
scheme for smart meters. The scheme not only aggregates the
consumption data from SMs but also defends fault tolerance
of malfunctioning SMs. In addition, the authors leverage zero-
knowledge based scheme to filter abnormal measurements
caused by energy theft without revealing the consumer details.
In addition, the authors claimed that their proposed scheme can
resist differential attacks. However, EIGamal encryption based
schemes are usually compute extensive. In another research,
Won et al. [178] proposed a privacy-assured aggregation
scheme for DR program in the smart metering. Particularly, the
authors designed a future ciphertext using the shared secrets
among SMs. The scheme utilized peer-to-peer network to
locate the neighbouring SMs for sharing the secrets. However,
the scheme may have practical issues, for instance if there
is a communication failure then SMs may not be able to
communicate with the aggregator. In addition, the scheme
may not resist to an impersonation attack. More literature on
asymmetric cryptosystems can be found in [179]–[182].
Homomorphic cryptosystem: The symmetric and asymmet-
ric cryptosystems are considered to be deterministic, which
invariably transforms the unique ciphertext for a given plain-
text and key. This may give room to an attacker/eavesdropper
to learn the partial information (i.e., information leakage) by
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TABLE XII
MITIGATION TO EAVESDROPPING/INTERCEPTION THREATS – ENCRYPTION SCHEMES IN SMART GRID METERING NETWORKS.
Sch-
emes Applications
Wireless/
Wired
Involved
entities
Test-bed/
Simulation
Sec. & Pri.
Goals Descriptions Ref.
SC Asset/datamanagement Wireless
SM,
substation,
Utility
Simulation 2,3
Pros: securing last mile smart grid using dynamic secrets; focus
on control center and substation; uses lightweight operations, e.g.,
XORing and Hashing; secure from MITM, replay and impersonation
attacks; and provide confidentiality.
[158]
Cons: malicious SN may lead many attacks.
SC
Data
& load
management
ZigBee SM, HAN Testbed 3
Pros: link layer based dynamic secret key is generated; a light-
weight encryption (i.e., XORing and Hashing); protection against
eavesdropping; and could be integrated with many applications.
[159]
Cons: link layer has inherent security issues including collisions,
exhaustion and unfairness that causes critical DoS threats. [172]
AC
Load
management
i.e., DD
unspecified
SM, DRP
Custermer
device
–
1,2,3,
8, 12
Pros: privacy-preserving protocol; incentive-based demand response;
provides privacy, availability, integrity, authenticity, confidentiality,
defending cheating customers; and anonymity and unlinkability.
[120]
Cons: requires high computational cost in registration and settlement
phase due to exponentiation operations.
AC Datamanagement
Wireless
mesh
network
SM, NAN Simulation 2,3,4
Pros: a tree-based secure power-usage data aggregation; uses the
blinding factor against insiders; and achieved secure data integrity and
batch verification.
[160]
Cons: computational costs are high that involves signature aggregation
and batch verification for SM and NAN (aggregator).
AC &
SC
Data
management ZigBee
SM, HAN,
Utility,
Cloud
Server
Simulation 3,4,7
Pros: to encrypt metering data, hidden vector encryption (HVE)
based range query is constructed; data confidentiality and data (query)
privacy are evaluated.
[161]
Cons: encryption requires high computational cost due to exponentia-
tion operations [173]; and HVE may have one-to-many communication
issues.
AC Load
management
Wired SM
DRS
Testbed 3
Pros: introduced an automated residential DR model; used OpenADR
2.0 protocol; Simulation and demonstration tests are conducted; uti-
lized PKI certificates and digital certificates
[162]
Cons: requires high computational cost in registration and settlement
phase due to exponentiation operations; lack of security analysis.
HE
Data
management
i.e., billing
Wireless SM, Utility – 3
Pros: privacy-preserving data aggregation; smart billing; fraud de-
tection; cryptographic commitment utilized homomorphic encryption;
privacy-preservation; and ensured data integrity and authenticity.
[165]
Cons: may incur significantly high computational on resource-hungry
smart meters [174]; and lack of proof-of-concepts and simulations.
HE Datamanagement
Wireless
mesh
network
SM, HAN,
Utility Simulation 3
Pros: a new problem is investigated called packet reassembly; used
TCP for secure data aggregation in AMI; and addressed a new
presentation layer; utilized a (secure) header including the packet size.
[163]
Cons: lack of threat model and security analysis.
HE Datamanagement unspecified SM, NAN – 2,3,8
Pros: presented a monitoring purpose system; preserves individuals
privacy; homomorphically aggregated consumptions of n members of
neighbourhood; and HMAC bsaed data integrity or a digital signature.
[164]
Cons: lack of performance analysis, and computation overhead on the
NAN is larger.
SC : symmetric encryption; AC : asymmetric encryption; HE : homomorphic encryption; DRP : demand response provider; DRS: demand response server;
TCP : transmission control protocol; HMAC : hashed messages authentication code; – : no proof of concepts/simulations;
Security and Privacy goals – 1 : Availability; 2 : Integrity; 3 : Confidentiality; 4 : Authentication; 5 : Non-repudiation; 6: Authorization; 7 :
Accountability; 8 : Anonymity; 9 : Unlinkability; 10 : Undetectability; 11 : Unobservability; 12 : Pseudonymity
performing the statical analysis on the transmitted ciphertext
[183]. To deal with such deterministic cryptosystems, the
homomorphic crytosystem is utilized heavily in the literature.
Homomorphic cryptosystem is an encryption that performs
computation on encrypted messages, without knowing the
secret key.
Borges et al. [165] suggested a privacy enhancing scheme
for smart metering. The protocol considered mainly two use-
cases: data aggregation, and secure and verifiable billing. To
achieve the user privacy, the smart meter uses homomorphic
encryption and computes a cryptographic-based homomorphic
commitment on the consumption usage. Thus, the consump-
tion usages, sent by the smart meter are kept secured through
homomorphic commitment or encryption and achieves privacy.
Borges et al.’s scheme may incur significantly high computa-
tional on resource-hungry smart meters [174]. Moreover, the
scheme lacks proof-of-concepts and simulations, so it is hard
to analyze its usefulness. To collect the fine-grained power
consumptions data, [163] investigated the feasibility and per-
formance of full homomorphic encryption (FHE) aggregation
in AMI networks utilizing the reliable data transport control
protocol (TCP). The scheme proposed in [163] lacks threat
model and security analysis.
Busom et al. proposed a smart metering data monitoring
scheme in [164]. The scheme utilized homomorphic encryp-
tion and achieved privacy. The authors considered that a
smart grid that consists of a neighbourhood k, contains smart
meters SMi, i ∈ 1, ..., k and power supply station PSt.
In the scheme, each SMi periodically (e.g., every 30 min)
sends electricity measurements mi to PSt. SMi generates
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a random noise value zi ∈ Zq and computes a ciphertext as
ci = Ency(mi+zi) = (ci, di), where Enc is encryption and y
is public key of SMi. Eventually, it transmits the result to PSt.
The PSt receives all values and then adds them to calculate
the total energy consumption. Busom et al. did not provide
the performance analysis, which may raise practicality issues.
Moreover, the smart meter has to perform hard computations,
and therefore, the computation overhead on the NAN gateway
is larger when there are many thousands of meters. Moreover,
more schemes on homomorphic encryption can be found in
[166], [184]–[187].
Authentication and access control schemes: Authentica-
tion mechanism is paramount that provides sufficient pro-
tection against eavesdropping, and eliminates unauthorized
entities [188]–[190]. Recently, a number of authentication
and access control schemes have been extensively studied in
smart grid applications [82], [143], [191]–[203]. Table XIII
summarises different approaches on how different entities in
smart grid ensures the authentication and access control.
Mohammadali et al. [143] proposed a novel identity-based
key establishment protocol (NIKE) that provides data con-
fidentiality. The authors employed ECC to achieve lower
computational overhead compared to existing protocols, partic-
ularly at the home gateway (i.e., meter side). In this scheme,
a meter (M) generates random nonce a and computes TM
and sends IDM , TM , RM to AMI Head-End (AHE), in the
first step. Here, IDM , RM is identity of meter and secure
parameter of M, respectively. In the second step, AHE, gen-
erates random nonce b, computes Tx, TAHE , kAHE→M and
M1, and sends TAHE , IDAHE ,M1 to a meter. In third step,
the meter computes kM→AHE ,M ′1 and checks M1 = M
′
1.
It then computes M2 and K, and sends M2 to the AHE. In
the final step, AHE computes and verifies M1 = M ′1. After
performing above three steps, a session key (K) can be derived.
The NIKE provides protection from MITM, impersonation and
desynchronization attacks. Furthermore, the security of NIKE
is verified using AVISPA tool.
Kumar et al. proposed a lightweight authentication and key
agreement for smart metering network in [191]. The scheme
is based on hybrid cryptography, i.e., ECC and symmetric
key. Before sending the consumption usage data to the NAN
gateway, a SM first verifies the NAN and then establishes
a secure connection. Likewise NIKE, the scheme is verified
using AVISPA tool. In addition, the authors implemented their
scheme on the IEEE 802.15.4-based SM test-bed. The scheme
may provide protection against many attacks (e.g., MITM,
replay, and so on), but it did not consider many privacy
features, such as unforgeability, undetectability, etc.
To report power consumptions, Chim et al. [192] proposed
privacy-preserving scheme. The proposed scheme also per-
formed gateway-assisted authentication while reporting the
power usage information. In the scheme, a smart meter sends
consumption information from home area gateway/meter to
the utility side gateway (i.e., control center) through the
building area gateway/meter. Here, the building area network
controls performing authentication and data aggregation. The
authors exploited a hash-based message authentication code
(HMAC) technique to perform the unilateral authentication,
and homomorphic encryption technique to achieve privacy.
Moreover, the true identity of home meter and the electricity
usage plans sent by meter are kept secret even from the utility
(i.e., control center) prior the electricity is utilized [192].
To provide security properties, a mitigation authentication
protocol is proposed by [193]. The scheme provides mutual au-
thentication and key agreement, and preserves identity privacy.
To attain a delicate trade-off (i.e., performance and security),
the proposed scheme utilized ECC primitive and achieved
privacy. The authors verified the security functionality of their
protocol using Gong-Needham-Yahalom (GNY) logic.
Following the identity-based cryptosystems, in [195], [196],
the authors proposed secure anonymous key distribution sig-
nature schemes. The authors claimed that their schemes can
provide mutual authentication and achieves anonymity at a
low computation cost while providing security against e.g.,
impersonation and replay attacks [195], [196].
To moderately mitigate outsider and insider attacks, in
[197], Saxena et al. proposed an authentication and autho-
rization scheme. Whenever a registered user wants to access
the smart grid device (e.g., smart meter), the scheme allows
to perform user’s authorization and authentication. Precisely,
to access the device, the users are granted permission dynam-
ically via the attribute-based access control. If the device is
being requested for an access then the identity of the user is
verified together with the device. Moreover, the scheme has
been formally analyzed, and is claimed that it can defend many
attacks, e.g., MITM, replay, impersonation, and repudiation
attacks [197].
In [198], Ruj-Nayak proposed a decentralized security
framework for smart grid. The framework supports two secure
features: (i) data aggregation, and (ii) an adequate access
control in smart grid. In a general scenario, the massive
amounts of consumer information are forwarded to the sub-
stations where the information are accessed by several remote
terminal units (RTUs). Therefore, to achieve the access con-
trol, the scheme employs attribute-based encryption (ABE)
which allows restricted access on the consumption information
that are stored in repositories (i.e., may be in a cloud). The
scheme utilized a key distribution center (KDC) to generate
and distribute the attributes and cryptographic keys to the RTU
and the consumers.
Considering the utility data/information centers/systems,
Baek et al. [199] designed a “Smart-Frame” framework for
smart grids. The framework effectively utilized the cloud
computing technology. The authors divided the framework into
hierarchical layers as follows. (i) Top cloud is used to securely
manage the management services or distribution services. (ii)
Regional cloud is used to store the user services securely. (iii)
End-user layer contains individual smart devices (e.g., a smart
meter at home). The Smart-Frame incorporated a security
solution which utilized an identity-based encryption (IBE) and
signature (X.509) and identity-based proxy re-encryption.
In the similar line of work, Mai-Khalil designed and im-
plemented of a secure billing model for SMs in [82]. The
authors encrypted SM data using a homomorphic asymmetric
cryptosystem and then, stored it on the cloud. Using the
homomorphic technique, Mai-Khalil proposed a method to
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TABLE XIII
MITIGATION TO EAVESDROPPING THREATS – AUTHENTICATION AND ACCESS CONTROL SCHEMES IN SMART GRID METERING NETWORKS
Application Wireless/Wired
Involved
entities
Test-bed/
Simulation
Sec. & Pri.
goals Descriptions Ref.
Data
management ZigBee
SM,
concentrator
AME
Simulation 1-4
Pros: novel identity-based key establishment between SM and AME;
very low overhead; formally verified using AVISPA tool; and secure
against replay, impersonation, MITM, and desynchronization attacks.
[143]
Cons: computational complexity is higher particularly at SM.
Data
management ZigBee
SM,
NAN Testbed 1-4,9
Pros: lightweight key establishment between SM and NAN; very low
overhead; formally verified using AVISPA tool; and secure against
replay, impersonation, and MITM attacks.
[191]
Cons: limited privacy features.
Data
management Wireless
HAN,BAN,
NAN,
Utility
Simulation 2,4,5,8
Pros: provide privacy to consumption unit; verification of consumption
unit via authentication; uses cryptographic commitment; homomorphic
encryption; bloom filter for data filtering; and secure against DoS.
[192]
Cons: unilateral authentication; significant overhead; and security
against attack is not analyzed.
Data
management – SM, NAN Simulation 4,9
Pros: authentication with identity protection; privacy protection at SM;
and less storage overhead and communication cost. [193]
Cons: no threat model; and no simulations/proof-of-concepts
Data
management – HAN, NAN Simulation 2,3,4
Pros: proposed a lightweight authentication; exploited bitwise
exclusive-OR operation; and achieved confidentiality, integrity and
authentication, and replay attack-resistance.
[194]
Cons: may require high communication cost at resource-limited SM.
Data
management Wireless
HAN/SM,
Service
provider
Simulation 2,4,8
Pros: secure anonymous key distribution between SMs and service
providers; uses identity-based signature and encryption schemes to
achieve anonymity; security under random-oracle model.
[195]
Cons: device secrets can be easily leaked, and cannot provide creden-
tials’ privacy [196].
Data
management Wireless
HAN/SM,
Service
provider
Simulation 2,4,8
Pros: secure authenticated key agreement; provable security; secure
against the well-known attacks (impersonation, reply, MITM, etc.);
and provides session key security.
[196]
Cons: requires high computational and communicational cost.
Data &
assest
management
Wireless
User, SM,
Subsation,
Utility
Simulation 2-4,6, 8
Pros: two factor authentication; access control; defeats various out-
sider attacks and insider attacks, e.g., MITM, replay, impersonation,
integrity violation, known key and repudiation attacks.
[197]
Cons: overall high communication overhead; and high computation
overhead for resource-hungry SM.
Data &
assest
management
–
HAN, BAN,
NAN – 3,4,6
Pros: proposed privacy-preserving aggregation; achieved access con-
trol; employed homomorphic encryption; and attribute based encryp-
tion.
[198]
Cons: may incur high communication and computation on SM.
Data
management Both
SM, Utility,
data storage Testbed 2-4
Pros: introduced ”Smart-Frame”; provides flexibility, scalability and
security features; used identity-based encryption; and implemented a
prototype.
[199]
Cons: may incur high communication and computation due to homo-
morphic encryption and PKI.
Data
management Wireless
SM, Utility,
Cloud Simulation 3,8
Pros: a cloud-based data storage and processing model; preserved
user privacy and confidentiality of data exchanged; used homomorphic
asymmetric cryptosystem; and many use-cases: (i) securely compute
energy consumption of customer and (ii) proposed billing algorithm.
[82]
Cons: may incur high computation overhead due to the high number
of homomorphic operations.
Load
management Wireless
DR client,
Server,
Utility,
Cloud
– 1-4,6,8
Pros: discussed cloud computing for DR program; proposed mapping
security objectives (identity management, access control, information
protection, critical asset protection).
[200]
Cons: lack of proof-of-concepts and simulations.
Security and Privacy goals – 1 : Availability; 2 : Integrity; 3 : Confidentiality; 4 : Authentication; 5 : Non-repudiation; 6: Authorization; 7 :
Accountability; 8 : Anonymity; 9 : Unlinkability; 10 : Undetectability; 11 : Unobservability; 12 : Pseudonymity
generate the energy bills for the customers based on their
total electricity consumption. More importantly, many real-
time experiments have been conducted including the complex-
ities of homomorphic operations, and computational timing
values in different billing periods. In another research, Mohan-
Mashima worked on cloud computing to secure automated
demand-response program [200]. Authors mainly focused on
OpenADR 2.0-related networks. In addition, the authors also
pointed out key security properties and discussed key chal-
lenges that should be undertaken when transforming data
from traditional DR networks to the cloud-based networks.
More studies on cloud-based authentication schemes for smart
meters can be found in [204], [205].
Other schemes: Following the different approaches, re-
cently, differential privacy-based schemes have been proposed
in smart metering networks. In [206], Zhang et al. proposed
two differential privacy mechanisms for the smart meters. The
two schemes are known as “battery-based differential privacy-
preserving (BDP)” technique and “cost-friendly differential
privacy-preserving (CDP) ” technique. In BDP, the authors
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suggested to install a rechargeable battery in a home. Typically,
a smart meter sends the total energy consumption from electri-
cal appliances and the battery. Therefore, the real fine-grained
energy consumption is hidden. The authors then extended
BDP idea and proposed CDP that utilized the dynamic and
static pricing policies. Though, the both schemes can achieved
differential privacy using the battery, a battery may have
limited capacity.
Summary: As the smart meters send sensitive information
(i.e., consumption usage data) via the wireless communica-
tion technologies, cryptography-based schemes are paramount
techniques to achieve privacy for information flow between
the homes and utility companies. We reviewed (i) encryp-
tion schemes considering symmetric encryption [158] [159],
asymmetric encryption [120], [160]–[162], and homomorphic
encryption [163]–[166], and (ii) authentication and access
control schemes [82], [143], [192]–[200].
Lessons Learned: The privacy issues of consumers are em-
anated from the consumption usage data as the data travelled
and stored in the form of plaintext in the SG metering network.
In the era of smart metering, in which consumption usage
data is invaluable to service providers, utility companies and
many more, existing proposed approaches may have a wide
attack surface. Nevertheless, as the smart meters are typically
resource constraints devices, we find following the trace of
SMI where the future researchers need to focus on overhead
in the terms of computational and communicational costs.
Indeed, strong cryptography requires extensive computation
and resource. For example, majority of proposed schemes in
Table XII utilized either homomorphic encryption or public
key infrastructure (PKI), which requires high resources. In
[183], Esposito-Ciampi argued that homomorphic encryption
and PKI systems are often too expensive. Therefore, we be-
lieve that choosing the right cryptography-based mechanisms
are challenging that must provide utmost confidentiality, while
minimizing resource consumptions (i.e., especially for the
SMs), as follows.
• Energy: As the SMI networks are not limited to the smart
electricity meters but also involved the smart gas meters.
For example, in Britain (and many other countries),
energy companies are rolling out smart gas meter as the
part of SMI network. Since the smart gas meters are
battery-powered, energy-efficiency could be a concern if
such heavy homomorphic encryption and PKI systems
are implemented on the battery-powered devices.
• Memory storage: Indeed, memory requirements depend
upon the applications. Since the security and privacy
methods are overhead on the applications, optimal storage
(i.e., program and data memory) for security and privacy
algorithms is a big concern, especially for the resource-
limited smart meters, sensors, and so on.
• Time complexity: How much the running time is needed
to execute the security and privacy mechanisms is another
concern. For example, to detect defective lines or appara-
tus protective relaying requires ≤ 4ms; and subseconds
requires in wide-area monitoring for transmission and
distributions, nevertheless the time complexity is one of
main concerns in the terms of security in smart grid.
Mitigation to forwarding point compromise: As shown
in the threat taxonomy, confidential information can be dis-
closed if a forwarding entity/node is semi honest in smart
grid. Such node can neglect routing packets that are supposed
to forward, transmit incorrect values, and manipulate protocol
messages to compromise the privacy of consumers.
To mitigate such issues, Dimitriou-Awad [207] proposed
a secure aggregation scheme that is resilient to semi honest
entities. The authors assumed that each meter (SMi) has
a set of neighbouring trustworthy SMs, denoted by TSi =
{SMi1 , SMi2 , ..} and each smart meter (SMi) shares a ran-
dom key/number with the SMs in the set TSi. The shared
key can be a symmetric or pairwise key. The main idea of
the protocol is that each smart meter (SMj ∈ TSj), (SMi)
generates a random number (Ki,j), and computes (Ki) =∑
SMj∈TSi Ki,j . Now SMi sends Ki,j to the SMj . At the
same time, SMi also obtains all the shared Kj,i that destined
to it from SMj ∈ TSi, and calculates the blinded energy
measurement (Bi = EMi + Ki
∑
SMi∈TSj Kj,i). Finally,
SMi sends Bi to the aggregator node. After receiving of all
blinded energy measurements, the aggregator node computes∑n
i=1Bi that is equal to
∑n
i=1EMi. The authors evaluated
that scheme is secure against the semi-honest attackers. Hence,
an attacker cannot drop the protocol messages, and cannot
manipulate the protocol messages to compromise the privacy
of legitimate smart meters/home owners.
In the Dimitriou-Awad’s scheme, as the number of SMs are
increasing in the trusted set TSi, the average delay and the
number of messages exchanged are increasing significantly.
Moreover, the authors did not consider the negative impacts
of their scheme. For example, if a smart meter leaves the set
(i.e., TSi), revoking the keys of moving smart meter becomes
an issue.
In another research, to protect the privacy leakage of
monitoring data in multi-hop environment, a novel broadcast
authentication protocol was proposed for WSN based smart
grid monitoring in [208]. In order to mitigate the attacks,
the control center (e.g., sender) constructs a cipher puzzle
and signs each packet with the secret key and broadcasts the
packets. Upon receiving the broadcast, all legitimate sensor
nodes solve the cipher puzzle, authenticate the received data
packets by verifying the signature, and check the hashed values
of packets via utilizing the public key of the control center.
The authors claimed that the packet arriving at the sensor
nodes (i.e., receiver) can not be manipulated. However, the
propagation delay of the proposed scheme increases linearly.
For instance, assumed that the sender broadcasts 20 packets
then the propagation delay is almost 13 seconds. In the same
vein, Camara et al. [209] proposed Infinite Timed Efficient
Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (inf-TESLA). The pro-
tocol provides a multicast delayed authentication to stream
synchrophasor data for controlling the phasor measurement
unit (PMU) that is deployed in the wide field area of electric
power network. The authors employed a dual offset key
chain method for minimizing the authentication delay and
computational cost. The inf-TESLA is safeguard to man-in-
the-middle attack.
However, the inf-TESLA may vulnerable to memory-buffer
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TABLE XIV
MITIGATION TO FORWARDING POINT COMPROMISE THREATS IN SMART GRID METERING NETWORKS
Application Wireless/Wired
Involved
entities
Test-bed/
Simulation
Sec. & Pri.
goals Descriptions Ref.
Data
management
IEEE 802
Wireless
SM,
aggregator Simulation 3,4,10
Pros: a secure aggregation scheme; resilient to semi honest entities;
utilized a symmetric or pairwise key; secure against malicious for-
warding point, safeguard to manipulation of packets.
[207]
Cons: main demerit – the average delay and the number of messages
exchanged are increasing significantly.
Assest
management
802.15.4
ZigBee
CC, SM,
sensor nodes Simulation 2,3,4
Pros: a novel broadcast authentication protocol for wide area moni-
toring; constructs a cipher puzzle to mitigate attacks; and resistance
to DoS Attacks and receiver compromise tolerance.
[208]
Cons: propagation delay of the proposed scheme is high.
Assest
management Wireless SM, NAN Simulation 2,4
Pros: a multicast delayed authentication protocol; wide area control;
utilized dual offset key chains technique; minimized authentication
delay; and secure from MITM attack.
[209]
Cons: the inf-TESLA suffers from memory-based DoS attack, high
communication cost.
SM : smart meter; NAN : neighbourhood area network; CC : control center; MITM: man-in-the-middle;
Security and Privacy goals – 1 : Availability; 2 : Integrity; 3 : Confidentiality; 4 : Authentication; 5 : Non-repudiation; 6: Authorization; 7 :
Accountability; 8 : Anonymity; 9 : Unlinkability; 10 : Undetectability; 11 : Unobservability; 12 : Pseudonymity
overflow attack, if many packets are flooded to the network.
Moreover, the communication cost in inf-TESLA is signifi-
cantly high, as compared to the traditional protocol.
Summary: Table XIV summarises the proposed approaches
that preserve privacy as well as mitigate the forwarding point
compromise threats. In addition, we presented the advantages
and disadvantages of the proposed schemes [207] [208] [209].
Lessons Learned: One of the main lessons is that there is
no single architecture/solution which is especially designed to
mitigate the forwarding point compromise threat, up to now,
in the SG metering network. However, the approaches that
address this issue somehow, e.g., [207] and [208], suffered
from high average delay and propagation delay, respectively,
as shown in Table XIV. Such high delays can raise availability
issues in the time-critical applications. In [207], the authors
discussed that a (malicious) forwarding point can be detected
via utilising the trusted set, but it is very likely a smart meter
may leave the trusted set then revoking keys may be another
prime concern. Moreover, Camara et al.’s [209] scheme suffers
from high communication cost and may be vulnerable to
memory-based DoS attacks.
Following the above-mentioned solutions, we believe that
there is a need of a dedicated solution/architecture that mit-
igates the forwarding point compromises in SG metering
network, so that these issues should be addressed and handled
appropriately in order to realize the real SG metering networks.
Mitigation to backhaul network interception: As the
sensitive information travels through the backhaul network,
it can be leaked if adequate security is not implemented,
as discussed in Section III. However, few of the recent
approaches mitigate such information leakage that can ensure
data security and privacy protection in smart grid domain
[121]–[123].
Mahmoud et al. [121] suggested privacy-aware scheme over
hybrid advanced metering infrastructure/long term evolution
(LTE)in smart grid. The basic idea of the scheme is that the
utility company collects the power bids from the consumers
in a secure and privacy-preserving manner. To achieve pri-
vacy, the authors suggested to use homomorphic encryption
so that the utility company cannot correlate the consumers’
bids. The use case is as follows – the utility wants to buy
energy from the consumers. The utility first generates a packet
(that includes, a signature and purchase price) and sends it
to the consumers via the aggregator node that utilizes the
backhaul (i.e., LTE) network. Second, the aggregator receives
the packet and checks the authenticity and integrity of the
packet. If results are true, the aggregator forwards the packets
to the consumers. Upon receiving the packet, the smart meter
verifies the authenticity and integrity, and sends a reply-packet
(i.e., a signature, amount of power unit, and price) back to
the aggregator node. Now, the aggregator collects the reply-
packets from all the consumers, and aggregates all these
packets in a secure way (using a signature and homomorphic
encryption). Then it sends the bid-packets to the utility. Finally,
the utility verifies the authenticity and integrity of the bid-
packets. Note that the individual’s bid cannot be correlated
at the utility company. The authors claimed that the scheme
is secure to many attacks, e.g., impersonation, replay, MITM,
and it achieves privacy.
The authors asserted their scheme is secure and privacy-
aware, but it incurs high communication costs due to large
packet sizes, which may not be practical for computation-
constrained smart meters. Moreover, in [122], the authors
demonstrated Mahmoud et al.’s scheme can reveal the bids
privacy at the utility. Further to Mahmoud et al.’s scheme, in
[122], Zhang et al. proposed an enhancement to mitigate the
privacy risks at the utility.
In another research, Kim et al. [123] proposed a new REMP
(i.e., resilient end-to-end secure message protection) mecha-
nism for large-scale cyber physical system (CPS) to eliminate
the need of traditional costly solutions, such as IPsec/TLS. The
REMP is a group-based architecture which utilizes the publish-
subscribe communication model. In a group communication,
the authors suggested to make use of the trusted third party
and/or authentication server that to distribute five types of
secret keys and security tokens to the publisher (P), subscriber
(S), and packet broker (PB).
To mitigate intermediate malicious entities, each P generates
33
TABLE XV
MITIGATION TO BACKHAUL NETWORK INTERCEPTION IN SMART GRID METERING NETWORKS
Application Wireless/Wired
Involved
entities
Test-bed/
Simulation
Sec. & Pri.
goals Descriptions Ref.
Data
management
IEEE 802
Wireless
SM,
aggregator,
utility
Simulation 2-4,8
Pros: a secure and privacy-aware power bidding scheme, utilizes LTE
network, ensures integrity and authenticity; safeguard to imperson-
ation, replay, man-in-the-middle attack.
[121]
Cons: incurs high communication costs, lack of threat model, can
reveal bids privacy [122].
Data
management
IEEE 802
Wireless
SM,
aggregator,
utility
Simulation 2-4,8
Pros: an efficient and privacy-aware power bidding, utilizes LTE net-
work, ensures integrity and authenticity; safeguard to impersonation,
replay, man-in-the-middle attack.
[122]
Cons: high communication overhead.
Assest
management 802.15.4
SM, Sensor,
field
devices
Simulation 2-4,8
Pros: An E2E packet protection, E2E authenticators per packet, high
scalability and extensibility. [123]
Cons: lack of practical assumptions.
Security and Privacy goals – 1 : Availability; 2 : Integrity; 3 : Confidentiality; 4 : Authentication; 5 : Non-repudiation; 6: Authorization; 7 :
Accountability; 8 : Anonymity; 9 : Unlinkability; 10 : Undetectability; 11 : Unobservability; 12 : Pseudonymity
a unique session key (using a random number) and uses
a symmetric encryption algorithm (i.e., advanced encryption
standard, AES) for securing each E2E packet sent. Upon re-
ceiving packet from P, the PB verifies whether the source of the
packet is a legitimate publisher who has access to the group,
and drops if any unauthenticated packet arrives. Then PB
forwards packet to the subscriber. When a subscriber receives
an encrypted packet, it verifies the source of the packet and
decrypts the packet using the shared key. The REMP provides,
E2E privacy, E2E integrity, packet source authentication and
confidentiality, forward and backward secrecy, and protects
against many attacks, e.g., replay, impersonation, long-term
key compromised. However, the authors have neither made
assumptions about the PB whether it is a trusted entity or nor
discuss the negative impacts if the PB is compromised.
Summary: Table XV summarises the proposed approaches
that are claimed to preserve privacy in end-to-end manner. In
addition, we discussed pros and cons of the proposed schemes
[121], [122], [123].
Lessons Learned: The backhual networks [210], [211] are
enablers for the NANs and WANs in SG metering network, as
they are operated by the network operators. As shown in [212],
a backhual network (e.g., LTE/4G) can have own inherent
privacy issues due to the lack of privacy requirements in the
standard security protocol. We believe that such weakness
may lead to many privacy threats. Therefore, the negative
impact of backhual networks should be further investigated as
consumptions usage data is invaluable to network operators,
and utility companies. Moreover, while reviewing the existing
schemes (refer to Table XV), we pointed out few observations.
For instance, the scheme proposed in [121] incurred high
communicational cost and the threat model is limited to replay
attack. Likewise, [122], in general, is also costly in terms
of communication costs. We believe that Kim et al. [123]
scheme, which is a publish/subscribe based architecture, is
more practical, as it imposes less communication costs, and
provides scalability and extensibility.
Mitigation to misuse of data: Trusted platform module
(TPM) based solutions (e.g., [213]–[216]) can be considered
as another approach to mitigate the misuse of data threats in
smart grid networks.
Paverd et al. introduced a novel and independent entity
called “trustworthy remote entity (TRE)” [124], [125] [127]
. Nowadays, it has been assumed that the utility company
does not need the individual’s consumption usages but it
mainly requires the total power usages from the homes.
The TRE is, therefore, a system (i.e., hardware, software,
or both) that demonstrates similar functional features as of
the trusted third party (TTP) but renders secure assertions of
its trustworthiness. The TRE aggregates energy consumptions
from several homes/smart meters and sends the aggregated
(consumptions) report to the distribution network operators
(DNO) in a privacy-preserving mode. The TRE is assumed
to set up a trust relationships between the consumer and
the DNO. For instance, an end-user believes that the TRE
preserves its privacy, whereas the DNO believes that the TRE
first authenticates an end-user and then it provides the aggre-
gated report correctly. The scheme incorporates mainly fol-
lowing: (i) meter-to-utility monitoring information, (ii) billing
information, and (iii) bi-directional demand response infor-
mation. Through formal analysis, the TRE not only achieved
authentication, integrity, and confidentiality, but also attained
undetectability and unlinkability. In addition, utilizing the
TPM and embed Transport Layer Security (TLS) cryptography
library, performance evaluations have been demonstrated on
different platforms, e.g., Intel TPM, Linux-TPM, VM-vTPM,
etc. For more details the reader may refer to [125].
In the same vein, Ankele et al. [217] pointed out that secure
multi-party computation (MPC) algorithms are inefficient if
there are high numbers of participants, e.g., (n) users, in
several use-cases. This is due to the fact of the traditional
settings, wherein MPC considered only input values as pri-
vate. Nevertheless, Ankele et al. pointed out the privacy of
the users on the ground of computational output values is
essentially needed. The authors, therefore, discussed many
scenarios linked to the MPC paradigm where the number of
participants are high (e.g., large scale applications: network
monitoring, billing, demand control, and so on). In addition,
the authors suggested the utilisation of TRE and proposed
privacy-preserving algorithm that can preserve the privacy
while providing confidentiality.
Gunes et al. [218] proposed a open cyber architecture
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TABLE XVI
MITIGATION TO MISUSE OF DATA –TRUSTED COMPUTING-BASED SCHEMES IN SG METERING NETWORKS
Application Involvedentities
Testbed/
Simulation
Sec. & Pri.
goals Descriptions
Ref.
Data
management
SM,
TRE, DSM
Simulation,
testbed 2-4,8-11
Pros: privacy-enhancing communication architecture; incentive-based
demand response application; a novel entity called trustworthy remote
entity; and provides authentication, integrity, confidentiality, unde-
tectability, and unlinkability.
[124],
[127],
[125]
Data
management
SM, TRE
Utility, etc. – 2,3,8
Pros: secure multi-party computation; propose TRE-based privacy-
preserving algorithms.
[217]
Cons: lack of proof-of-concepts or simulations.
Data
management
HAN, WAN/
utility Simulation 2-4,8
Pros: an open cyber architecture; a blind processing framework; uses
TPM hardware; minimize human intervention; and secure to MITM,
session injection, and side channel attack.
[218]
Cons: the system boot time is considerably slow (i.e., ≈ 82 seconds).
Data
management
SM,
Concentrator Simulation 2,4,8
Pros: Proposed privacy protection scheme; used trusted smart meters;
exploited remote anonymous attestation; used attribute certificates for
hiding platform attributes; prevented private information; and ensured
detection of trusted software updates, if any.
[219]
Data
management
SM/HAN,
utility/
central systems
Testbed 2-4
Pros: uses of protected module architectures; implements high assur-
ance smart meter; and security analyzed; and guarantee integrity and
confidentiality.
[220]
Cons: does not protect against DoS attack when a buggy application,
e.g., overwrites crucial OS data structure.
DSM: demand side manager; SP: service provider; OS: operating system; SGIT: interactive terminal of smart grid; TAS: trusted access server; –: unspecified.
Security and Privacy goals – 1 : Availability; 2 : Integrity; 3 : Confidentiality; 4 : Authentication; 5 : Non-repudiation; 6: Authorization; 7 : Accountability;
8 : Anonymity; 9 : Unlinkability; 10 : Undetectability; 11 : Unobservability; 12 : Pseudonymity
(OCA) and enhanced information sharing among the utility
operators and transmission levels. The entire smart grid net-
work is divided into three main networks: (i) HAN; (ii) MAN;
and (iii) WAN. In all three networks, multi-owners devices
are interacting with each other in the top-to-bottom approach.
To address privacy concerns in the multi-owner systems, the
authors suggested a blind processing framework that provides
secure data sharing to the dedicated user or process. For the
blind processing, a TPM hardware is being utilized so that
human operators/network administrators can not access the
plain-text of sensitive information. To achieve this, a smart
meter first attests identity of the remote entity then establishes
a secure channel using its keys to encrypt/decrypt messages.
Within the TPM, sensitive data is shielded based on different
states of the system and then utilized in the blind processing. In
addition, their framework can provide security against MITM
attack, session injection and hijacking attacks, and safe from
side channel attacks [218]. The proposed OCA may have
issues. For instance, the blind executions need robust and
trustworthy software to process the smart meter information
and to check integrity of other processes. This paper did
not provide investigation on the negative impact of the blind
processes if a buggy software is running on the platform
that may raise concern of the OCA’s effectiveness. Moreover,
detecting bugs in the blind execution may be challenging,
since it requires more sophisticated techniques (e.g., machine
learning) and resources. Another major issue with the OCA
is that the system boot time is substantially slow ( i.e., ≈
82 seconds) that may lead to several system-level denial of
service attacks [221].
Zhao et al. [219] proposed the idea of a trusted smart
meter (TSM). In the scheme, attribute certificates are being
utilized for hiding the platform configuration information of
a smart meter. On the contrary, to hide the user sensitive
information, cryptography-based ring signatures are adopted.
Based on RSA ring signature, the TSM can provide a list
of properties: correctness, anonymity, and unforgeability. In
addition, using the digital certificates, a smart meter attributes
can be protected. The authors claimed that their scheme
provides security against the private information leakage attack
while achieving the efficiency. Moreover, the scheme can
detect whether the software update is trusted or not. The
proposed scheme evaluated the execution time values for
several ring sizes, on the Intel Xeon E5-2407 v2 CPU (2.40
GHz) and 4 GB RAM. However, the main drawback of the
ring-based scheme is that whenever a trusted smart meter
wants to assert its real identity to the data concentrator, it
must include neighbouring trusted smart meters by their public
key certificates and then compute a ring signature. Moreover,
a ring signature scheme can preserve privacy of the smart
meters at the data concentrator whilst a faulty meter and/or
compromised meter can not be simply detected at the data
concentrator, since identity of a (compromised) smart meter is
hidden in the ring.
Mu¨hlberg et al. [220] proposed a protected module ar-
chitecture (PMA) designed for smart metering. The PMA
mainly considered three use cases: billing, load switching and
consumer feedback between the smart meter, and utility. The
authors claimed that their scheme can achieve confidentiality
and integrity of internal states in the PMA and authentic
execution of (event-based) distributed applications can run
on the shared infrastructure with a low trusted computing
base (TCB). The designed architecture is evaluated using low-
powered TI-MSP430 micro-controller based smart meter. The
evaluation parameters are lines of code and binary size in
the terms of bytes. However, the scheme has less confidence
in authentic execution security guarantees, as the number of
supporting software packages (including, embedded operating
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systems, module loaders, event management components, etc.)
are specified as untrusted.
Summary: Table XVI summarises existing trusted comput-
ing techniques (with their pros and cons) on SG metering
networks. In the trusted computing world, indeed, an adversary
is not able to obtain the sensitive information by eavesdropping
over wireless channels since the transmitted information are
kept privacy-cognizant from the source where they are being
generated. The existing trusted computing based solutions are
a good first attempts but not all solutions can be deployed
directly to such complex SG metering networks.
Lessons Learned: Due to the heterogeneity of SMs, data
concentrators, control centers, the appropriate embedded se-
curity and privacy mechanisms (i.e., trusted computing) are
essential in SG metering network. We believe that the TRE
based schemes, e.g., [124], [125], [127], [217], are more
promising for the SG metering networks. The architecture
discussed in [218] attempts to proposed OCA that utilizes
blind processing techniques to provide data privacy to multi-
owners in the smart grid domains. However, one of the main
lessons of this scheme is how to design and develop the
robust and trustworthy application/software to execute the
blind processes for the entire domains. Moreover, analysing
the negative impact of blind processing can be significant since
a malicious system may inject false information to the entire
network. Such false information particularly raises concern of
trade-off between effectiveness and security of the open cyber
architecture in the smart grid network. In [219], Zhao et al.
proposed the idea of trusted smart meter that provides privacy
protection utilizing the digital ring signatures. The verification
of a number of signatures usually poses long delays, which
may lead to DoS attack to the data concentrator.
Majority of TPM based schemes ( e.g., [218]–[220], may
suffer from scalability issues. For instance, in a simple smart
metering infrastructure (SMI), all the smart meters maybe run
the same application on the homogeneous (hardware) platform,
making this fairly easy for the research purposes. However, in
the real-world situations, the SMI network generally consists
of different types of smart meters (i.e., heterogeneous) or
different data concentrator nodes running several (different)
applications. In more extreme cases, the SMI network may
be comprised of many smart meters from different vendors
running various distinct applications, e.g., demand-response,
control commands, billing, etc. Therefore, there needs to be
more in-depth analysis on how to store and manage the
information necessary to attest a million of devices in a secure
and scalable manner.
However, more studies need to be done in different direc-
tions. For instance, on-fly-software updates are complicated to
handle and so are the key management.
XI. RESEARCH ISSUES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this section, we summarize a list of open research
issues, and discuss them in terms of research problem, existing
preliminary solutions, and the future research work.
A. Reproducibility issue
Research problem: The biggest concern related to the system
level countermeasures, theft to privacy countermeasures, and
privacy countermeasures is that they suffer from reproducibil-
ity of research results in this SG domain. The majority of
existing literatures (as shown in Tables VIII, IX, X, XI, XII,
XIII, XIV, XV, XVI) evaluate their approaches by simu-
lation instead of real-world devices. For example, most of
the proposed schemes use wireless mode (i.e., either ZigBee
or mesh network) but none of them evaluates their security
properties with real smart meters. Therefore, there is a less
confidence in assessing the risk of the attacks and efficacy of
the countermeasures by their work. This is due to the lack of
access to real smart meter devices, i.e., the access of smart
meter is either non-existent or limited to the older meters.
Preliminary solution: A few researchers have implemented
and evaluated their schemes using the off-the-shelf devices.
For instance, Liu et al. [159] evaluated secret-based encryption
scheme using CC2430-F128 based smart meters. Other works
[189], [191] [220], [143], and [208] evaluated the security
prices using TI MSP430 and MPR2400 based off-the-shelf
devices, respectively. Nevertheless, they are just the minority.
Lack of real device may result from custom proprietorship
machinery, undocumented devices, strict limitations on the
systems, and so on [222].
Future research directions: The direct access to the devices
appears to be limited at present. Therefore, a comprehensive
study on how the simulation study is different from the real-
device study can either (1) build the confidence of applying
existing mainstream evaluation approaches, or (2) minimize
the threats to experimental validity.
B. Lightweight cipher suites issues
Research problem: Many computation and communication
devices (e.g., smart meter, sensors, etc.) in SMI have re-
source constraints in nature, e.g., ZigBee devices. These
devices demand for the lightweight cipher suites (standard-
ized protocols) that can be employed to provide adequate
(symmetric/asymmetric) encryption, authentication, and other
paramount security properties [31].
Preliminary solution: For resource-hungry devices (i.e., smart
meters, sensors, etc.), it is widely accepted that the public
and private key (i.e., asymmetric key cryptography) based
mechanisms are considerably expensive with respect to com-
putational complexities (timing and energy cost). In contrast,
the symmetric cryptography based primitives are easier to
apply and fairly superior. However, one main issue with sym-
metric key cryptography for millions of SG devices is its key
distribution and management. On the contrary, homomorphic
cryptosystem can transform a given plain-text into multiple
ciphertexts and each of them will be randomly selected for
communication. Indeed, the homomorphic operation provides
security against information leakage attack (or requires robust
cryptanalysis). On the other hand, homomorphic encryption
generates larger messages to be exchanged among the entities
[183]. Consequently, the larger the messages are, the slower
the performance is, as shown in mitigations to forwarding
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point compromise threats [207], [208]. Moreover, Table XVII
summarizes the merits and demerits of the cryptographic
schemes, which are analyzed in Section-V.
TABLE XVII
MERIT AND DEMERIT OF CRYPTOSYSTEMS [183]
Cryptosystem Merit Demerit
Symmetric Fast encryption and
decryption
Bother of agreement on the used
key
Asymmetric Simple key manage-
ment
Bad encryption and decryption
performance for resource hungry
devices
Homomorphic Robust and compute
arithmetic operations
on encrypted data
Expansion issue, higher overhead
and other performance issues
Clearly, each cryptosystem suffers from its specific de-
merits, which requires a new set of lightweight symmetric,
asymmetric, or even other possible cryptosystems for securing
SG applications.
Future research directions: Given the merits and demerits
listed in Table XVII, a more lightweight cipher technique or
protocol with regard to limited resources is in great need.
C. Over the air upgrades [223] – Advanced Key Management
Research problem: SMI requires an enhanced feature of
key upgrading in timely manner, which upgrades the required
keys running in end-users smart meter throughout its normal
lifespan. However, such enhanced features come with potential
risks (e.g., location migration), if adequate security measures
(e.g., key management techniques) are not employed from the
very beginning of the system design.
Preliminary solution: Recently, a number of schemes have
been proposed to mitigate location migration threat [156],
[115], and to mitigate privacy concerns [190], [195], [196].
These schemes particularly focus on key distribution and
management in the SG network. However, many of these
schemes are either vulnerable to security attacks or incurred
high computational costs at the computation-constraint smart
meters and sensors.
Future research directions: Designing a security system that
stands the test of time for the over next 15 years is a non-
trivial task. For above case, how to design a sophisticated key
management framework could be a promising research topic –
that can provide strong foundation to the security and privacy
goals (refer to Section IV) and seamlessly extend security
services (i.e., over the air upgrades) across multiple platforms,
and networks in the SG networks.
D. Secure and efficient routing protocol
Research problem: In SG metering communications, different
entities (e.g., smart meter, data concentrator, servers, demand
response management system, etc.) will exchange messages
back and forth via single-hop or multi-hop routing protocols.
These protocols will find out the optimal path in terms of
quality of services [110]. As the SMI network suffers from
limited communication bandwidth [59], it is much easier to
fall prey to DDoS attack and result in network congestion.
Moreover, it can be noted that none of the routing scheme is
designed with a focus of routing privacy, except Nicanfar et
al.’s scheme [86].
Preliminary solution: Nicanfar et al. [86] proposed a new
secure routing algorithm to route the packets from source
to destination. The routing algorithm utilized network coding
technology. Indeed, such (network) coding-based protocols can
maximise the network throughput. On the other hand, they
bring plethora of issues, such as significant increase in buffer
capacity, maximised packet delay, and high computational
costs on resource-hungry devices [224]. Rahman et al. [225]
proposed a formal analysis method for dependable SCADA
systems. The main focus is to formally verify secure routing
for the SCADA devices (i.e., grid side), while neglecting the
end-users devices (smart meters).
Future research directions: Advanced secure and efficient
(end-to-end) routing protocols need to be developed and inte-
grated to assure end-to-end latency, high reliable data delivery
and network throughput. We believe that while designing
the secure routing protocols, the future research should also
consider the possible aspects of privacy (refer to Section IV,
privacy goals) in smart metering routing protocols.
E. Novel security mechanisms against DoS attacks
Research problem: As cognitive radio (CR) technology is
being widely deployed into SG networks, it experiences many
new security and reliability issues [100]–[105]. A recent
research demonstrates that a delicate design of jamming and
spoofing attacks, can reduce the super users spectrum avail-
ability and transmission performance [103].
Preliminary solution: In [151], the authors proposed a secure
and reliable cognitive radio (CR) solution in SG. This scheme
uses a CR sensor that communicates over CR network to
transmit consumption usages to the field or neighbourhood
area network. This research utilized a physical unclonable
function (PUF) to generate the secret keys and to add the noise
to the keys. However, the noise needs a correct error detection
technique that usually demands high computational resources.
Therefore, we believe that more analysis is still needed.
Future research directions: To mitigate DoS threat, cross-
layer attack detection techniques and security mechanisms are
new research topics, since CR networks are widely deployed
into the SG networks. To realize a viable security in smart grid
meter network, the secure mechanisms should be integrated in
the cross-layer design, i.e., from top layer to bottom layer and
other aspect of the whole system [104]. Quantum cryptography
based key distribution (QKD) and management techniques can
be another area of research in SG. For instance, quantum
secure communications and applications in power grid have
been an interest around the globe [226]. In a recent research
[227], the authors proposed and simulated a QKD based
security solution for IoT-based smart grid. We believe that
there are many important applications of QKD that should be
explored in the SG metering networks.
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F. Advanced trusted systems based privacy-preserving mech-
anisms
Research problem: The communications in current SG me-
tering network raise many privacy concerns if the consumption
data is misused. The utilities commonly aggregate meter
reading data on 15 or 30 minute intervals. The data may
be used for many purposes, e.g., billing, load management,
etc. However, the consumption data can also be misused to
infer what types of appliances are being in a home. Having
access to such data, the consumer electronics company may
start to promote their appliances, which may be intrusive to
the consumers. Therefore, privacy leakage turns out to be an
inevitable problem in SMI system.
Preliminary solution: In one of the leading progress efforts,
Paverd et al. [124] [127] presented a privacy-enhancing com-
munication architecture using trusted remote entity (TRE). The
TRE can ensure that consumption usages are not disclosed
and misused at the utility side. The authors utilized trusted
computing to mitigate the cyber security and privacy threats in
the next generation energy networks. Considering SG as case
study, similar work is also presented in [215] [217]. However,
such techniques (TRE) could suffer from single point of attack
as pointed out in [181].
Future research directions: Advanced trusted computing
based privacy-preserving mechanisms needs to be explored
where the consumers can control their information and main-
tain privacy.
G. Security and privacy assessment tools
Research problem: As the scale of smart metering system
increases, it is imperative to systematically evaluate the robust-
ness and weakness of each security and privacy solution before
the real-time implementation. Thus, it brings the demand for
customizing the conventional security assessment simulators.
Preliminary solution: Most of the traditional security assess-
ment tools (e.g., AVISPA [228], ProVerif [229], etc.) focus on
the generic network adversary model (e.g., Dolev-Yao attack
model [230]). In addition, TrustFound [231] applies model
checking to verify the security of TPM-based systems and
protocols. Early studies have utilized game theory and/or logic
based techniques. However, the gap between theoretical analy-
sis and practical tool implementation has not been fulfilled yet
in the SG applications. Recently, Fawaz et al. [232] introduced
a real cost model work-flow. The model first understands
system logs and cyber alerts. If any log or alert appears, it
is translated into response costs. In addition, in the context of
an attack impact – the authors researched what is the impact
on a system if security state changes. Another work [233]
applies formal and systematic analysis of different types of
security assessment techniques to provide an integrative tool
for security assessment on large-scale real-world SG metering
networks/systems. Nevertheless, there is a lack of technique
to customize these works on SG scenarios.
Future research directions: To fill the gap between theo-
retical analysis and practical deployment, the future research
should either enhance existing assessment tools (AVISPA,
ProVerif, etc.) or explore new implementations.
XII. CONCLUSION
The traditional power-grids world-wide of today will trans-
form to the next-generation smart grids in the coming future.
These grids are able to exploit the advantage of two-way
communication and deliver sustainable and reliable power to
the end-users. However, the success of SG metering network
depends on its security properties. Another crucial feature of
SG metering network is the consumers’ privacy, i.e., how
to aggregate consumers’ data without disclosing their per-
sonal and sensitive information. A strategic communication
framework integrated with robust security and privacy features
should be designed in the very beginning of the smart grid
technology deployment. Therefore, security and privacy in
power grid are considered as an emergent research theme,
which is worth analysing.
This survey discusses a comprehensive survey on security
and privacy research in SG metering network. We discuss
the real cyber attacks incidents in the power industry and
related applications. In addition, we investigate detailed threat
taxonomy including system-level, theft of service, and pri-
vacy/confidentiality threats that has led to the security and
privacy requirement in SG metering networks. Moreover, we
present and compare the advantages and disadvantages of
state-of-the-art existing most up-to date solutions, then finalize
this paper by pointing out the future research problems.
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